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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
To alleviate poverty, make work pay, and help low-wage workers and 
lower-income families meet rising costs of living, the federal government should 
expand the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). 
Targeted expansions to the credit, and new options for workers to receive 
the EITC’s proceeds throughout the year (rather than in a lump sum), would 
ensure more economically inclusive growth, especially in the major metropolitan 
areas where the bulk of America’s working poor resides. 
America’s Challenge 
Even as the U.S. economy was growing strongly in recent years, median 
household incomes and average hourly wages stagnated.  Today, about one-
quarter of the nation’s workforce is employed in low-wage jobs, and low-wage 
occupations are projected to account for 30 percent of U.S. job growth in the 
coming years.  Meanwhile, prices for necessities such as housing, transportation, 
and child care have continued to rise for lower-income workers and families.  
Slowing economic growth, and a potential recession, place additional, immediate 
pressures on the nation’s less-skilled, lower-wage workforce. 
Limitations of Existing Federal Policy 
Because it reduces poverty and inequality while promoting work, the EITC 
is widely acknowledged as one of the singular successes of American social 
policy in recent decades.  Yet the EITC could do more for certain workers and 
families to help make work pay and to close the growing gap between stagnant 
wages and rising prices.  Moreover the annual lump sum in which nearly all EITC 
is delivered is not well-timed to help low-income families meet their year-round 
needs. 
A New Federal Approach 
The federal government should expand and modernize the EITC, and in 
doing so help an estimated 8.4 million tax filers in the nation’s 100 largest 
metropolitan areas, and 14.5 million nationwide, by: 
• Tripling the maximum EITC for low-income, childless workers to about 
$1,300 in tax year 2008, boosting the financial return to work and ensuring 
that the federal government does not tax these workers into deeper poverty 
• Allowing married couples to exclude one-half of a second earner’s 
income when calculating the EITC, thus reducing economic disincentives for 
low-income couples to marry and for spouses to join the labor force 
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 • Expanding the EITC for working families with three or more children; 
these families are twice as likely as smaller families to have low incomes, but 
they receive no incremental assistance under the current EITC 
• Creating a new, streamlined periodic payment option that would provide 
eligible tax filers with a portion of the credit’s proceeds directly from the IRS 
throughout the year, as other countries with similar tax credits do 
BROOKINGS · June 2008 4
 I. INTRODUCTION 
Millions of American workers, many of them raising children, earn low 
wages.  Research suggests that at least one in four U.S. workers can be 
classified as low wage earners.1   
The U.S. economy has created low-wage jobs at a considerable pace in 
recent decades, in sectors such as retail, accommodation and food service, 
health care, child care, and other personal services.  Experts have pointed to 
advances in global trade, technological change, shifting demand among U.S. 
consumers, and the declining power of unions as factors, among others, that 
have contributed to the growth in low-wage work.2  Yet prices for necessities like 
housing, utilities, transportation, and child care have risen rapidly in recent years, 
even as wage and income growth has stalled for a large segment of the 
workforce.3
Like most industrialized societies, the United States has adopted policies 
to help people in low-wage work support themselves and their families, providing 
many with access to subsidized child care and health insurance, and nutritional 
assistance.  Perhaps most significantly, the federal government subsidizes 
earnings for low-income workers through the tax code.  The Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC), created in 1976, has grown over the past 30 years into the nation’s 
largest program for the so-called “working poor.”  In tax year 2006, more than 22 
million lower-income families claimed over $43 billion via the EITC.  Many of 
these families also benefit from other provisions of the federal tax code for lower-
income filers, like the Additional Child Tax Credit.  Moreover, working families in 
nearly half of all U.S. states can now qualify for a supplement to the federal EITC 
through their own states’ income tax codes.  The support provided to low-income 
workers via the EITC is widely regarded as a singular success of American social 
policy in recent decades, and has prompted other nations to adopt similar 
strategies. 
Yet the EITC, which last underwent a significant expansion in 1993, has 
not kept up with the growing gap between wages and prices for many working 
families, particularly those in major metropolitan areas.  The credit exhibits 
particular limitations for certain categories of lower-income tax filers: childless 
workers; dual-earner couples; and families with three or more children.  In 
addition, the lump-sum tax refund by which 99 percent of EITC recipients gain 
access to the credit is ill-suited to help workers meet the rising day-to-day, 
month-to-month costs of providing for themselves and their children. 
Policies to achieve more inclusive growth in metropolitan areas form a 
central concern of the Blueprint for American Prosperity, an initiative launched by 
the Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings.  This paper asserts that the 
federal government has a unique responsibility and ability to address the wage 
stagnation confronting American workers, and to improve labor market incentives 
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 that can help the nation achieve more robust, broad-based economic growth.  
Such policies are of particular importance to the nation’s large metropolitan 
areas, which exhibit some of the widest degrees of economic inequality, have 
among the highest relative prices for housing and transportation, and house large 
concentrations of low-income working families. 
To that end, Congress and the next administration should expand the 
EITC, and create a new method for delivering the credit’s proceeds to low-
income workers throughout the year.  This report illustrates the impacts that 
these proposed expansions would have on working families in each of the 100 
largest metro areas in the United States, using the results from a new EITC 
eligibility model.  The proposed expansions would together cost about $12 billion 
in 2008, and provide roughly 60 percent of their benefits to tax filers in the 
nation’s 100 largest metro areas.  Expanding the EITC for these workers and 
families would make those in 39 of the 100 largest metro areas eligible for a 
further $358 million in state and local versions of the credit. 
With nearly all the economic gains of this decade accruing to earners near 
the top of the income distribution, and with prices of basic necessities continuing 
to rise, the federal government should re-commit itself to achieving a broader 
distribution of the rewards from economic growth.  Expanding the EITC 
represents an efficient and effective means to meeting that goal. 
II. LOW-WAGE WORK PERSISTS AMID RISING PRICES 
At the moment, the United States faces the prospect of slowed economic 
growth and a possible recession, precipitated by problems in the mortgage 
market.  Such a downturn could place new pressures on the nation’s less-skilled, 
lower-wage workforce, whose members in past recessions have been among the 
first to suffer the ill effects of economic turmoil.4
To some degree, workers are already feeling the effects of a slowdown in 
growth.  As of April 2008, workers spent an average of 16.9 weeks unemployed, 
compared to 12.5 weeks in December 2000.  Roughly 18 percent of unemployed 
workers were still looking for jobs after 27 weeks out of work, up from 11 percent 
in 2000.5  Moreover, workers who lost their full-time jobs in the early 2000s were 
not always able to find new full-time work or a job that offered the same pay.  
Farber finds that 13 percent of these workers ended up taking part-time jobs, 
while those who managed to find full-time work earned about 13 percent less on 
average in their new positions. 6
Yet the economic issues facing America’s workers, especially those at the 
lower end of the wage spectrum, predate current market instability.  To be sure, 
the U.S. economy has expanded at a healthy pace overall in recent years.  After 
a brief downturn in 2001, real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew relatively 
rapidly from 2002 to 2006, at an annualized rate of 3 percent.7  During the same 
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 time period, however, real U.S. median household income rose by only 0.4 
percent annually.8  Real average hourly earnings for private-sector U.S. workers 
failed to grow, and the most recent evidence suggests that wages have begun to 
fall in recent months.9  As a result, the gap between productivity growth and 
median family income growth has reached its widest point in the postwar era.10
Wage stagnation among less-educated American workers traces an even 
longer history.  Between 1973 and 2005, average hourly wages for workers 
without a high school diploma dropped precipitously, while those for workers with 
only a diploma or some college remained virtually the same (Figure 1).  
Meanwhile, earnings for workers with at least a college degree rose significantly.  
Economists generally attribute this rise in wage inequality to a combination of 
factors, including increased global trade, technological advancements, declines 
in unionization and the real value of the minimum wage, and shifts in U.S. 
demand toward services.11  While wages for these types of workers did manage 
to increase during periods with very tight labor markets, such as the late 1990s, 
the long-term trend has clearly disadvantaged workers with fewer credentials. 
How prevalent is low-wage work in the American labor market today?  The 
answer depends on the exact definition used; estimates include: 
• 35 million workers (26 percent) who earned less than $9.83 hourly in 2006, 
equivalent to a poverty-level income for a family of two adults and two 
children at full-time, year-round work;12 
• 44 million workers (33 percent) who earned less than $11.11 hourly in 2006, 
equivalent to two-thirds of the median wage for men ($16.66 hourly);13  
• 9.2 million working families (27 percent) who had incomes under 200 percent 
of the federal poverty threshold in 200214  
Thus, research generally reflects that at any given time, at least one-
quarter of the U.S. workforce, and a similar percentage of working families with 
children, is employed in low-wage jobs.15  Whether and how much the low-wage 
labor market has grown over time depends on the definition used, but by one 
measure, the share of workers earning poverty-level wages or less grew from 24 
percent in 1973 to 29 percent in 1997.16
The U.S. economy is projected to continue creating low-wage jobs at a 
brisk pace.  According to Bureau of Labor Statistics projections, about 30 percent 
of net job growth between 2006 and 2016 (roughly 4.6 million new jobs) will 
occur in occupations that require only short-term, on-the-job training.  In May 
2006, median annual earnings from these jobs were less than $20,000.17
Wage stagnation in the lower ranks of the wage distribution has affected 
workers in most major metropolitan areas during the current decade.  In 81 of the 
88 largest metro areas for which data are available, workers at the 20th percentile 
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FIGURE 1.
Wages Have Stagnated for Less-Educated Workers
8
 of the wage distribution experienced real declines in the value of their wages 
from 1999 to 2005.  In 8 of these metro areas, the real wage decline exceeded 
10 percent (Table 1).  
Amid this persistence in low-wage work, and stagnating wages at the 
lower end of the wage distribution, costs of living continue to rise for lower-
income working families:18
• On housing, median rental costs increased almost 5 percent between 2000 
and 2006, at the same time that median family income dropped by more than 
3 percent.  In 71 of the nation’s 100 largest metro areas, HUD fair market 
rents for 2-bedroom apartments rose by more than the rate of inflation 
between 1999 and 2005.  In several large metros, including San Diego, Los 
Angeles, San Francisco, Washington, Denver, and Minneapolis-St. Paul, the 
inflation-adjusted increases exceeded 20 percent (Table 1).  In nearly all of 
these metro areas, wages at the 20th percentile fell over the same period.  In 
Ventura County, CA, fair market rents rose an astounding 43 percent, even 
as wages for less-skilled workers fell 12 percent. 
• Working families bear the burden of rising energy costs, too.  Between 2000 
and 2006, the price of utilities increased at double the rate of inflation.  
Meanwhile, the rising cost of oil translated into much higher gas prices, which 
rose at 3.5 times the rate of inflation.19  Despite depending more heavily on 
public transportation than other groups, 72 percent of lower-income workers 
still rely on private vehicles for their commutes, and are thus heavily affected 
by rising gas prices.20   
• Child care represents another significant cost for many working families.21  
Between 2000 and 2007, the inflation-adjusted cost of full-time care for an 
infant or preschool-age child increased by 14 percent.22  In fact, in 43 states 
the average cost of keeping an infant in full-time care at a center in 2006 
exceeded the average tuition and fees at a public college.  Family child care 
arrangements offer a less expensive option than child care centers for 
working parents, but licensed homes on average still cost between $3,500 
and $9,500 a year for one child.23 
To be sure, these rising prices affect families throughout the earnings 
distribution, but they arguably exact the greatest toll on those who have the least 
room for error in their budgets.  In short, the nation’s low-wage workers—
especially those in major metropolitan areas—are swimming upstream, 
contending with rising costs for basic necessities even as their earnings flatten, 
and the labor market picture sours further. 
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TABLE 1.
Wages Have Stalled Recently for Many Workers, While Rental Costs Continued to Rise
Metro areas with largest declines in real wages at 20th percentile, and largest increases in 2-bedroom Fair Market Rents, 1999 to 2005
Metro Area Change (%) Change (%)
1999 2005 1999-2005 1999 2005 1999-2005
Metro Areas with Largest Declines in Wages at 20th Percentile of Distribution
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 11.22 9.84 -12.3 1089 1168 7.3
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 9.23 8.13 -11.9 963 1382 43.4
El Paso, TX 6.69 5.91 -11.7 613 548 -10.5
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC 9.22 8.17 -11.4 637 714 12.0
Trenton-Ewing, NJ 11.20 9.97 -11.0 973 977 0.4
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 11.51 10.27 -10.8 1050 1201 14.4
Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land, TX 8.23 7.35 -10.6 706 726 2.8
Greensboro-High Point, NC 8.59 7.72 -10.2 616 609 -1.2
Raleigh-Cary, NC 9.58 8.66 -9.6 750 779 3.9
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 8.34 7.57 -9.2 691 645 -6.7
Metro Areas with Largest Increases in Fair Market Rents for 2-Bedroom Apartments
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 9.23 8.13 -11.9 963 1382 43.4
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA 9.16 9.02 -1.5 728 960 31.9
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 9.29 8.85 -4.8 931 1183 27.1
St. Louis, MO-IL 8.91 8.37 -6.0 587 731 24.7
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 8.41 7.94 -5.6 944 1168 23.8
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 11.05 10.50 -5.0 1163 1425 22.5
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD 10.97 10.46 -4.6 962 1178 22.4
Denver-Aurora, CO 9.59 9.61 0.1 744 884 18.7
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 10.96 9.96 -9.1 788 928 17.8
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 7.81 8.42 7.8 669 787 17.6
* Wages at 20th percentile of all wages earned in metro area.  Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and American Community Survey data
** HUD fair market rent for 2-bedroom apartment.  FMRs estimated for new metro area definitions based on population-weighted average of county FMRs.
All dollar amounts reported in 2005 dollars, deflated using applicable regional CPIs.
Wages ($)* Fair Market Rent ($)**
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 III. BOOSTING INCOMES THROUGH THE EITC PROMOTES BETTER SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC OUTCOMES  
Like most industrialized nations, the United States—at multiple levels of its 
federal system—has adopted policies and programs to help ameliorate the side 
effects of economic downturn and persistently low wages on the well-being of 
workers and their families. 
For instance, the federal Child Care Development Fund supports the 
provision of free and low-cost child care for lower-income working parents.  
Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) provide 
access to subsidized health insurance for children in such families.  Low-wage 
workers can qualify for nutritional assistance such as Food Stamps and the 
Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC).  
The Low Income Heating Assistance Program (LIHEAP) assists many lower-
income working households in meeting their home energy costs.  And many 
working families benefit from programs that subsidize their housing costs, such 
as the Housing Choice Voucher Program and the Low Income Housing Tax 
Credit.  For various reasons, however, these programs fail to reach all eligible 
families (see section V). 
Perhaps the most significant support for working families is embodied in 
the federal income tax code.  The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) provides a 
wage subsidy, in the form of a tax refund, to more than 22 million working 
families annually.  In tax year 2006, those tax filers claimed over $43 billion in 
credits via the EITC.   
To qualify for the EITC, one or more members of a tax filing unit must 
work.  As shown in Figure 2, families with two children and earnings up to about 
$40,000 can claim the credit for tax year 2007.  The largest credits are available 
to filers with incomes in the $10,000 to $15,000 range.  For the lowest-income 
families with children, the EITC can represent 34 to 40 percent of annual 
earnings.24  Unlike most federal tax credits which apply only to the extent they 
reduce a filer’s tax liability, the EITC is refundable.  This means that eligible 
claimants can receive the full value of the credit for which they qualify, regardless 
of their bottom-line income tax liability.  About half of the EITC’s benefits go to 
working families with children earning less than $15,000 annually, most of whom 
owe no federal income tax, but all of whom face payroll tax burdens.25
By helping “make work pay” for low-income families, the EITC addresses 
a number of problems that face less-skilled workers and those in lower-wage 
occupations, while benefiting the economy and society as a whole.  The EITC: 
• Reduces poverty, especially among children.  The EITC reduced the total 
poverty gap—the aggregate difference between poor families’ resources and 
the poverty threshold—for families with children by 20 percent in 1999.26  
According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, in 2003, the EITC 
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FIGURE 2. 
The Earned Income Tax Credit Provides up to $4,800 to Working Families in Tax Year 2008 
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 lifted 4.4 million people out of poverty, including 2.4 million children.  The 
program lifts more children out of poverty than any other single program or 
category of programs.27  In doing so, the EITC may also reduce the long-term 
economic and social costs of child poverty, which economist Harry Holzer and 
colleagues have estimated at roughly 4 percent of GDP.28 
• Promotes labor force attachment.  Several studies have concluded that 
expansions to the EITC during the 1980s and 1990s were responsible for 
increasing employment among single mothers.29  One study estimates that 
the EITC and other tax changes accounted for more than 60 percent of the 
increase in single mothers’ work between 1984 and 1996.30  Another 
attributes 34 percent of the increase in employment among single mothers 
between 1993 and 1999 to EITC expansions.31  Furthermore, during an 
economic downturn, the EITC can improve the financial return to employment 
for workers who may experience a drop in earnings due to cutbacks in hours, 
lowered wages, or a lack of full-time job opportunities.32  Strategies that 
promote sustained employment have shown promise in growing the earnings 
of less-skilled workers.33 
• Reduces inequality and spreads the benefits of growth.  The EITC helps to 
reduce income inequality, which has reached record levels in the United 
States in recent years.34  The Congressional Budget Office finds that the 
EITC and related low-income credits boost the share of total income received 
by households with children in the bottom fifth of the income distribution by 
1.2 percent.35  While this still leaves average after-tax income in the top 
quintile 10 times that in the bottom quintile, the EITC clearly helps to mitigate 
high and rising levels of inequality.  Efforts to reduce high levels of inequality 
may also help to sustain the political consensus for policies that aim to 
promote economic growth generally, and ensure that the economy makes the 
most of all citizens’ productive potential.36 
Other aspects of the federal tax code complement the EITC’s support for lower-
income working families, and also help to reduce poverty, promote work, and 
achieve more broad-based growth.  In particular, since 2001 working families 
with earnings of at least $10,000 (adjusted annually for inflation) have benefited 
from a refundable portion of the Child Tax Credit.  In tax year 2005, the 
Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC) provided refunds totaling nearly $15 billion, 
over $9 billion of which was claimed by families with children who also earned 
the EITC.  Because filers do not qualify for the ACTC until they earn at least 
$11,000, the EITC provides stronger work incentives for the significant share of 
low-income filers who earn below that amount.37
In addition to helping families, the EITC acts as an economic boon to the local 
communities where low-income working families live.38  The large concentrations 
of low-wage workers residing in the nation’s major metropolitan areas translate 
into large financial infusions via the EITC.  In that respect, proposals to 
strengthen the EITC to address the limitations of the credit described above are 
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 de facto metropolitan policies.  The proceeds of the federal EITC go, of course, 
to individual workers families, rather than to state, regional, or local governments.  
But by supporting the ability of low-income families to meet rising costs of living, 
the EITC stimulates regional economies, and alleviates the fiscal burdens that 
poverty can impose on lower levels of government.39
For several reasons, it is appropriate that the federal government assume 
particular responsibility for policy efforts like the EITC aimed at supplementing 
wages for low-income workers and families: 
• The economic and demographic dynamics that have given rise to a growing 
supply of low-wage jobs, and stagnant wages for less-educated workers, are 
widespread.  With wages for workers near the bottom of the distribution 
dropping in 81 of the 88 largest metropolitan areas between 1999 and 2005, 
and failing to keep pace with rental costs in 78 of these areas, a problem of 
clearly national scope merits a nationwide response. 
• While state and local governments are taking steps themselves to help 
supplement wages for working families (see Section V), these actors lack the 
economic stability and fiscal capacity to provide tax relief and wage subsidies 
at levels sufficient to address the full range of challenges described above.  
Unlike at the federal level, state and local fiscal policy tends to be counter-
cyclical, which means that support for low-income workers and families often 
contracts during lean economic times, when it is needed the most.  Tax 
competition with other jurisdictions and balanced budget requirements also 
constrain the ability of states and localities to significantly augment the 
incomes of low-wage workers.40  And several states lack an income tax 
altogether, limiting the policy tools at their disposal to help low earners.41  
Finally, the federal government simply has more capacity than other levels of 
government to address these challenges; all U.S. state and local 
governments combined raised $1.6 trillion in general revenue from their own 
sources in 2004-05, compared to federal revenues of $2.2 trillion that year.42 
• Notwithstanding the national scope of the challenges described above, some 
areas of the country clearly face larger challenges than others in supporting 
low-wage workers and families due to variable price pressures for goods and 
services like housing, health care, and utilities.  For this reason, state and 
local supplements to the EITC are important platforms for addressing the 
variable gap between wages and prices across the country.  Yet the labor 
markets within which workers face these challenges often encompass 
hundreds of local governments, and many—including 20 of the 100 largest 
metro areas—cross state boundaries.  Thus, the geographic reach of these 
problems across jurisdictional lines provides a further basis for a robust 
response at the national level, upon which higher-cost states and localities 
can and should build. 
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 IV. THE EITC COULD DO MORE TO SUPPORT WORKERS AND FAMILIES 
The EITC stands out as one of the singular successes of recent American 
social policy.  Researchers and policymakers of all political persuasions have 
hailed the credit’s success in reducing poverty and promoting work, achieved 
with minimal bureaucratic overhead through the tax code.43  As Section V notes, 
the credit has inspired a growing number of U.S. states, and even other nations, 
to provide their own tax code benefits for lower-income workers and families. 
Yet there remain areas in which the credit could do more to help 
America’s low-wage workforce achieve better economic and social outcomes.  In 
particular, certain categories of low-wage workers and low-income families could 
use a further leg up from the EITC to help them succeed in the labor market and 
meet rising costs of living.44
1. The EITC for childless workers is very small 
The last significant expansion of the EITC occurred in 1993.  That year’s 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA-1993) increased credit rates for 
families with children, especially for those with two or more children.45  Those 
changes effectively doubled the size of the credit over the subsequent few years.   
OBRA-1993 also created a new EITC for workers without qualifying 
children who had incomes of $9,000 or less.  This “childless worker credit” (for 
which, despite its common moniker, a significant number of non-custodial 
parents also qualify) was designed to offset the employee’s share of payroll tax 
for very low earners, phasing in at a rate of 7.65 percent.  At the time, the credit 
had a maximum value of about $300 (for workers with incomes of $4,000 to 
$5,000), less than 10 percent of the maximum credit value for families with two or 
more children.  As shown in Figure 2, the childless worker credit’s maximum 
value today is $438.  Thus, the credit for childless workers provides a modest 
boost, at best, to the wages of workers at the very bottom of the earnings 
distribution.   
There are several reasons why the federal government should increase 
the EITC for childless workers: 
• Many of these workers face significant challenges in the labor market.  While 
employment rates have increased over the past 20 years for less-educated 
women, employment among less-educated men has actually declined.46  
Table 2 shows that in many major metropolitan areas, especially those of the 
older industrial Northeast and Midwest, young less-educated males exhibit 
low employment rates.  Boosting the EITC for childless workers could make 
work more attractive to less-skilled males, encouraging more to enter the 
labor market, as an expanded EITC did for single mothers in the 1990s.47   
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TABLE 2.
In Several Large Metro Areas, At Least One-Quarter of Young, Less-Educated Men Are Not Working
Large metro areas with civilian employment rates of 75% or less for men aged 21-40, not in school, with no more than high school diploma, 2005
Metro Area Total Employed Unemployed
Not in Labor 
Force Employed (%) Unemployed (%)
Not in Labor 
Force (%)
Louisville, KY-IN 57,211 42,932 5,614 8,665 75.0 9.8 15.1
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC 25,742 19,294 2,805 3,643 75.0 10.9 14.2
Wichita, KS 26,655 19,967 4,475 2,213 74.9 16.8 8.3
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 104,229 77,955 11,386 14,888 74.8 10.9 14.3
Jackson, MS 22,004 16,161 1,389 4,454 73.4 6.3 20.2
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE 283,621 208,110 31,784 43,727 73.4 11.2 15.4
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT 46,035 33,778 5,249 7,008 73.4 11.4 15.2
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 77,662 56,364 8,374 12,924 72.6 10.8 16.6
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 73,136 52,976 8,175 11,985 72.4 11.2 16.4
Springfield, MA 41,263 29,828 5,043 6,392 72.3 12.2 15.5
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 65,630 46,974 10,219 8,437 71.6 15.6 12.9
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 226,997 162,400 30,586 34,011 71.5 13.5 15.0
Pittsburgh, PA 89,854 63,578 9,784 16,492 70.8 10.9 18.4
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 19,636 13,874 1,508 4,254 70.7 7.7 21.7
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 51,563 35,284 8,610 7,669 68.4 16.7 14.9
100 Largest Metro Areas 10,539,885 8,509,759 835,973 1,194,153 80.7 7.9 11.3
Source: Brookings Institution analysis of American Community Survey data
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 • Low-income childless workers face much higher tax burdens than their 
counterparts with children.  According to the Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, the poorest fifth of non-elderly childless adults pay, on average, 
more than four times as large a share of their income in federal taxes as do 
low-income families with children.48  The disparity widened in 2001 when the 
Child Tax Credit was made partially refundable, a step that delivered 
additional tax relief to some low and moderate-income working families with 
children, but did not benefit childless workers. 
• As a result, poor childless workers—unlike families with children—are actually 
taxed deeper into poverty by federal taxes.  Under current law in 2008, a 
single worker with no children and a poverty-line income ($11,014) would owe 
federal income and payroll taxes of $949, even after accounting for the 
EITC.49  By contrast, a single mother with two children at the poverty line 
($17,056) in 2008 would receive a net federal tax benefit of almost $4,000 
(Figure 3). 
The small value of the EITC for childless workers contributes to low take-
up of the credit among these filers, many of whom are therefore not part of the 
tax system.  The GAO/IRS estimates that only 45 percent of workers without 
qualifying children who were eligible for the EITC claimed the credit.  The modest 
amount of the EITC available to these filers could be eroded quickly by fees for 
tax preparation and associated financial products, further lowering their 
incentives to file.  Boosting the credit for these workers may make it more 
worthwhile for them to file, and eventually help bring more of them into 
compliance with the tax system. 
For numerous reasons, it is appropriate for government to invest 
considerably in the well-being of families with children, most importantly to 
improve children’s life chances.50  In fact, this paper argues below that 
government should do more through the EITC for certain types of families with 
children.  The question is how to strike the right balance between support for low-
income workers with, and low-income workers without, children.  In light of the 
successful efforts we have made to reduce tax burdens for low-income parents 
with children in recent years, there is now a strong argument to bolster tax-code 
assistance for childless workers. 
2. The EITC creates an implicit tax penalty on low-income, dual-earner 
couples 
A second issue with the current EITC concerns its treatment of two-earner 
couples, and the “marriage penalty” it implies for some single-parent families.  
Most EITC recipients are working single parents with children.51  Such filers face 
the prospect of losing most, if not all, of their EITC if they marry another low 
earner.  For instance, a married couple filing jointly, raising two children, and 
earning $30,000 would qualify for an EITC of $2,453 in 2008.  As two single filers 
earning $15,000 each, however, the parent with two children would qualify for an 
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FIGURE 3.
At the Poverty Line, Childless Workers Are Taxed Deeper Into Poverty
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 EITC of $4,824—nearly $2,400 more than in the married case.52  To the extent 
that the credit’s current structure makes marriage less attractive for such 
couples, it may frustrate efforts to increase the share of children growing up in 
married-couple households, which research has shown improves their long-term 
outcomes.53
Additionally, the current structure of the EITC may reduce labor force 
participation and/or hours worked by modest amounts for second earners in 
married-couple households, due to the implicit tax on their earnings associated 
with the phase-out of the credit.54  This could be viewed positively, to the extent 
that EITC proceeds allow non-working parents to spend more time with their 
children.  At the same time, one must weigh these effects in light of the credit’s 
goal to promote work in lower-income families. 
With respect to either couples considering marriage, or already-married 
couples, the federal government could do more to ensure that the EITC reduces 
existing disincentives to marriage and work, and supports low-income dual-
earner couples in their efforts to provide for themselves and their families. 
3. The EITC offers no incremental assistance to large families 
A third limitation of the existing EITC is that it makes no incremental effort 
to reduce poverty among working families most likely to experience it—those with 
three or more children.  The credit has tiers of increasing generosity for childless 
workers, families with one child, and families with two or more children.  Families 
with three or more children qualify for no additional EITC benefits beyond what 
families with two children may claim.   
However, families with three or more children are much more likely to 
have low incomes than other types of families, even when they are working.  In 
2000, 28 percent of employed families with three or more children had incomes 
below 150 percent of poverty, compared to 12 percent of one-child families and 
14 percent of two-child families.55  In addition, certain costs of living are higher 
for low-income families with three or more children, though wages are generally 
not.  Housing, child care, and food expenses can all consume larger proportions 
of these families’ budgets, but the current structure of the EITC makes no 
adjustment to help them meet those higher costs. 
The state of Wisconsin recognized the special economic burdens borne by 
large families when it created the first state-level version of the EITC in 1989.  
Wisconsin’s EITC provides a much more generous credit for families with three 
or more children than for families with two children.56  The federal government 
could take a similar step to ease the financial burdens on these working families 
nationwide. 
BROOKINGS · June 2008 19
 4. The benefits of the EITC are not timed to coincide with household 
needs 
A final shortcoming of the EITC concerns how and when low-income 
workers and families receive its proceeds.57  Because the EITC is part of the 
federal income tax code, the overwhelming majority of recipients gain access to 
the credit in the same way that taxpayers generally benefit from tax credits—
through their annual tax refunds.  But a once-a-year lump sum fails to strike an 
appropriate balance between recipients’ desire to accumulate savings, and their 
need to meet ongoing expenses. 
Research suggests that EITC recipients use the bulk of their tax refunds to 
finance consumption, such as paying everyday bills like rent and utilities, often 
overdue by the time their refunds arrive.58  This is not surprising, because for 
many families, the EITC makes up the difference between their earnings and the 
poverty line.  The credit can account for as much as 43 percent of a family’s 
earnings net of taxes in 2008.  That almost one-half of EITC recipients pay a 
commercial tax preparer for a refund anticipation loan (RAL) or refund 
anticipation check (RAC) suggests that these households face liquidity 
constraints, and exhibit a demand to accelerate their EITC payments to meet 
immediate household needs.59
Low-income workers with children do have the option under current law to 
receive a portion of their projected EITC in their paychecks—up to $34 per week 
in 2008 via the Advance EITC.  Yet in tax year 2004, an extremely small share of 
EITC recipients used this option, and total reported advance payments 
represented between 0.2 percent and 0.4 of EITC claims for families with 
qualifying children.60  Despite existing since 1979, advance payments have 
never been a significant feature of EITC administration. 
Most EITC recipients express a preference for receiving their payments 
via lump sum.61  Those preferences are shaped in part by the several problems 
that limit the utility of the current advance payment option for lower-income 
taxpayers, and contribute to its very low take-up:  
• Lack of awareness.  A 2005 survey at a community tax return preparation 
program found less than one-third of respondents were aware of the advance 
payment option.62  Although experiments aimed at increasing awareness 
have produced statistically significant increases in utilization of the Advance 
EITC, those increases amount to small increments in the number of taxpayers 
enrolled in the option.63 
• Fear of overpayment.  Because the Advance EITC is based on a taxpayer’s 
projected earnings, changes in family or economic circumstances during the 
year could result in a taxpayer receiving credits through her paycheck that 
exceed the credit amount for which she is eligible.  Such amounts must be 
reconciled on the tax return, and can result in a decreased refund or 
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 increased payment to the IRS.  To minimize this overpayment risk, current 
law caps advance payments at 60 percent of the EITC for one qualifying 
child, or $1,750 in 2008.  That is only a little more than one-third the 
maximum credit available to families with two or more children.  The lack of 
any tolerance for modest overpayment, and the highly conservative advance 
payment cap, arguably lead many taxpayers to eschew the option altogether. 
• Transaction costs.  To receive advance payments, a taxpayer must complete 
IRS Form W-5 and submit it to her employer, who then calculates the 
appropriate advance credit amount and adds it to the worker’s paycheck.  In 
addition to perhaps being reluctant to involve one’s employer in the 
transaction, taxpayers must submit a revised form if their circumstances 
change during the year, and must re-enroll each new calendar year to 
continue receiving the payments.  The difficulty of calibrating payments 
correctly, especially if the taxpayer holds more than one job, or has a spouse 
or other family member who works, may frustrate participation as well.  A 
network of large employers have come to see advantages in the existing 
Advance EITC as an additional support for their workers, but most 
employers—especially smaller ones—see little incentive in promoting the 
option and assisting workers in accessing it. 
The lack of viability of the current advance payment option suggests that 
many lower-income working families forego expenditures that they might be able 
to make if a more effective option existed for making EITC payments periodically.  
This is especially relevant for families who live in high-cost areas of the United 
States.  In the San Diego region, for instance, the fair market rent for a 2-
bedroom apartment in 2005 was $1,183, or $14,200 annually.  In the absence of 
periodic assistance, EITC-eligible families in the that area are likely greatly 
constrained in their housing and neighborhood choices, or forego other 
necessities in order to afford decent shelter. 
These taxpayers, like American taxpayers generally, will certainly continue 
to exhibit some demand for forced savings that lump-sum EITC payments 
provide.64  Yet a better designed advance EITC could appeal to a much broader 
cross-section of recipients, enabling them to exercise greater choice in their 
purchase of day-to-day, month-to-month necessities such as housing or child 
care.65  Devising a new periodic payment option becomes even more important 
as lawmakers consider proposals to expand the EITC, and to create or expand 
other refundable tax credits.66   
Despite the limitations explored here, the EITC remains better designed to 
respond to the economic challenges facing lower-income working families than 
many other programs.  Because it operates through the tax code, the credit has 
low administrative costs compared to most other income-transfer programs.67  
Partly as a result, the credit also exhibits a higher participation rate among 
eligible workers and families, especially those with children, than do other 
means-tested programs like TANF, Food Stamps, and subsidized health 
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 insurance.68  Still other programs, such as subsidized child care and housing 
vouchers, serve one-quarter or less of income-eligible families because of 
funding limitations.69  And as noted above, the EITC also continues to enjoy well-
deserved bipartisan support due to its effectiveness in reaching low-income 
families, and in supporting work as the best route out of poverty. 
V. STATES, LOCALITIES, AND OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE INCREASED THEIR EFFORTS 
TO HELP WORKING FAMILIES THROUGH THE TAX CODE 
While the federal government has not expanded the EITC significantly 
since 1993, state governments, and even a few local governments, have filled 
the breach by enacting EITCs of their own that build on the federal credit.  In 
addition, other nations have witnessed our success with the EITC and have 
themselves provided new support for workers through their own tax codes, in 
some cases going further than the United States to make work pay for their 
lower-income families. 
In 1993, at the time of the last major federal EITC expansion, six states 
had their own version of the EITC within their state income tax codes.  Three 
were refundable like the federal credit, providing the full value of the EITC to 
filers regardless of tax liability; and three were nonrefundable, providing the EITC 
only to the extent that it reduced credit recipients’ tax owed.70  Today, 22 states 
and the District of Columbia have EITCs, and fully 20 of those EITCs are 
refundable (Map 1).  Almost all of the refundable credits “piggyback” on the 
federal income tax code by making filers who qualify for the federal EITC eligible 
for a percentage of that credit on their state income tax forms.71  The generosity 
of state EITCs ranges from 3.5 percent of the federal credit in Louisiana and 
North Carolina to 35 percent in the District of Columbia.72
States have used EITCs to make their own income tax codes less 
regressive, to augment welfare reform strategies, and to make work pay better 
while helping their low-wage workers and families keep up with rising costs of 
living.73  In general, states with higher costs of living, such as New York, 
Maryland, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia tend to provide larger EITCs 
as a percentage of the federal credit.  Somewhat less expensive parts of the 
country, such as Nebraska, Indiana, Oklahoma, and Iowa tend to provide smaller 
credits.74   
A few U.S. localities have gotten into the EITC act, too.  In 1999, 
Montgomery County, MD, just outside of Washington, DC, became the first local 
jurisdiction in the nation to offer a refundable EITC.  The program matches the 
refundable Maryland EITC dollar-for-dollar, at 20 percent of the federal credit.75  
In 2002, the city/county of Denver followed suit with a 20 percent match to the 
federal credit, using funds available through the TANF block grant.76  New York 
City implemented a refundable EITC through its local income tax that year, at 5 
percent of the federal credit, that augments the state’s 30 percent EITC.  And in 
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*Wisconsin's refundable EITC is 4% for families with one qualifying child, 14% for families with two qualifying children, and 43% for families with three or more qualifying children.
*Rhode Island has a nonrefundable EITC equal to 25% of the federal credit; of that portion, 15% is refundable, so that 3.75% of the federal credit is effectively refundable.
*In tax year 2007, Maryland taxpayers could claim either a 50% nonrefundable EITC or a 20% refundable EITC; the refundable credit rate was increased to 25% for tax year 2008.
*Colorado has a 10% refundable EITC which has been suspended since tax year 2001.
Map 1. 22 States and the District of Columbia Offer EITCs that Build On the Federal Credit
Presence and Level of State EITCs, Tax Year 2007
Source: www.stateeitc.com
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 2005, the city/county of San Francisco introduced the Working Families Credit, 
which in its first two years matched the federal credit at about 10 percent.77
States have not stopped at providing a simple match to the federal credit.  
Two have gone further to increase the size of their credits for low-earning 
noncustodial parents, thereby significantly augmenting the state analog to the 
federal EITC for childless workers for which these filers would otherwise qualify.  
In New York State, noncustodial parents who are current on their child support 
orders are eligible for a state EITC equal to the greater of 2.5 times the federal 
credit for childless workers, or 20 percent of the federal EITC for workers with 
one qualifying child.78  The District of Columbia provides a similar credit for 
younger noncustodial parents.  And as noted earlier, the state of Wisconsin has 
long provided a larger match rate for families with three or more children, 
recognizing the particular burdens of working poverty that they face. 
The influence of the EITC has extended beyond the United States.  The 
success of the credit has helped to stimulate the growth of so-called “in-work 
benefits” in other developed nations.  These include, among others, the Working 
and Child Tax Credits in the United Kingdom; the Prime Pour L’Emploi in France; 
the Employed Persons Tax Credit in the Netherlands; and the Working for 
Families Tax Credits in New Zealand.79  Holt shows that in-work benefits in many 
of these countries for low-wage workers with children have come to exceed those 
which the United States provides via the EITC and Child Tax Credit.  Moreover, 
many countries (including Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the UK) 
all use mandatory or optional periodic payment mechanisms that allow recipients 
to access a much larger proportion of their benefits throughout the year than 
EITC recipients (Table 3). 
The experiences of an increasing number of U.S. states and localities, and 
other nations, affirm the efficacy of the EITC and making work pay through the 
tax code.  They also suggest new directions for federal policy, including 
expanding the EITC for childless workers and larger families, and improving 
periodic payment options to better align the timing of EITC benefits with family 
needs. 
VI. CHANGES TO THE EITC WOULD BENEFIT MILLIONS OF WORKERS AND FAMILIES IN 
THE NATION’S MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS 
Several proposals have been advanced by poverty and tax policy 
researchers, on Capitol Hill, and by the presidential campaigns to expand the 
EITC to address the limitations of the credit described in the previous section 
(see Table 4).  Information about the projected effects of these proposals 
typically characterizes their benefits for workers and families nationwide.  Yet 
much of the proposals’ eventual impacts will be felt in the major metropolitan 
areas where these taxpayers are concentrated.  Moreover, a growing number of 
public, private, and non-profit leaders are working within major cities and suburbs 
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TABLE 3.
Other Countries Provide More Generous In-Work Tax Benefits Periodicially Throughout the Year
Australia Canada New Zealand United Kingdom United States
Relative Poverty Rate (under 50% 
median income)* 12.2% (2003) 12.4% (2000) n/a 12.5% (1999) 17.3% (2004)
Program Name Family Tax Benefit, Parts A&B
Child Tax Benefit; 
National Child 
Benefit 
Supplement
Working For 
Families Tax 
Credits
Child Benefit; Child 
Tax Credit; 
Working Tax Credit
Earned Income Tax 
Credit; Child Tax 
Credit
Administering Agency
Family Assistance 
Office; Australian 
Taxation Office
Canada Revenue 
Agency
Inland Revenue; 
Ministry of Social 
Development
HM Revenue and 
Customs
Internal Revenue 
Service
Annual Benefit Amount** $9,432 $5,557 $7,262 $17,599 $5,271
Periodic Payments Optional Mandatory Optional Mandatory Optional
Payment Frequency Options
Biweekly direct 
payment; reduced 
withholding
Monthly direct 
payment
Weekly or biweekly 
direct payment
Weekly or monthly 
direct payment
Same as payroll 
frequency
Periodic Payment Amount $322 (biweekly) $463 (monthly) $279 (biweekly) $1,354 (monthly) $66 (biweekly)
Periodic Disbursement Method Direct deposit to financial institution
Direct deposit to 
financial institution, 
or check
Direct deposit to 
financial institution
Direct deposit to 
financial institution
Addition to 
paycheck by 
employer
* Percentage of individuals with disposable income (after taxes) under 50% of national median income
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Key Figures, accessed at www.lisproject.org/keyfigures.htm  [April 2008]
** Calculated for single parent, two pre-school children, full-time work, earning $15,000 (child care components excluded)
Source: Holt, "Periodic Payment of the Earned Income Tax Credit"
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TABLE 4.
Presidential Candidates, Members of Congress, and Research/Advocacy Organizations Have Advanced Several Similar Proposals to Expand the EITC
Author Childless Workers Married Couples
Families with Three or More 
Children Other Cost Estimate
Hillary Rodham Clinton Triple the maximum credit amount Add a third tier for families with three or more children not available
John Edwards Triple the maximum credit amount Reduce the marriage penalty not available
Barack Obama
Increase the maximum credit by 
16%; Phase-out begins after 
reaching the equivalent of a full-time 
minimum wage worker's earnings; 
Non-custodial parents who meet 
child support obligations will receive 
double the expanded benefit
Reduce the marriage penalty Increase the benefit for families with three or more children not available
Senator Evan Bayh (and co-
sponsors Senators Blanche 
Lincoln and Barack Obama) 
By 2012, increase the maximum 
credit by 16%; Phase out begins 
after reaching the equivalent of a full-
time minimum wage worker's 
earnings; Double the credit for non-
custodial parents who meet child 
support obligations
Raise the phase-out points by 
an additional $1,000 not available
Representative Danny Davis 
(and 11 co-sponsors)
Increase phase-in income limit and 
maximum credit amount
Raise the phase-out points by 
an additional $1,000 not available
Senator John Kerry; 
Representative Bill Pascrell, Jr.
Double the phase-in and phase-out 
rates to 15.3%; Double the maximum 
credit amount
After 2009, raise the phase-out 
points by an additional $2,000
Add a third tier with a phase-in 
rate of 45% and a phase-out rate 
of 21.06%
Permanently extend the 
special rule that treats 
combat pay as earned 
income for the purpose of 
the EITC
not available
Reresentative Charles Rangel Double phase-in rate to 15.3% and double the maximum credit amount
Extends special rule that 
treats combat pay as 
earned income for the 
purpose of the EITC
not available
Senator Charles Schumer 
Lower age requirement from 25 to 
21, except for full-time students; 
Double the phase-in rate to 15.3% 
and change the phase-out amount to 
equal 200% of the phase-in income 
limit; Double the maximum credit 
amount; For non-custodial parents 
paying child support, increase phase-
in rate to 30.6% and quadruple the 
maximum credit amount
not available
Gordon Berlin (2007)
Make the credit amount between 50 
and 100% of the current EITC 
payment for families with one child; 
Change age requirement to include 
filers aged 21 to 54; Filers must work 
at least 30 hours a week to qualify 
Couples can claim the credit as 
individuals.  For couples with 
children, the principal earner 
claims the children using 
current credit parameters, 
while the lower-earning spouse 
claims the new individual credit
For workers who owe child 
support, the EITC would 
be used to cover child 
support obligations
$29 billion ($33 
billion if 
accounting for 
work effects)
Mayor Michael Bloomberg
Lower age requirement from 25 to 
21; Double the phase-in/phase-out 
rates to 15.3%; Triple the maximum 
credit amount
Couples can claim the credit as 
individuals.  One earner claims 
the children, while the other 
claims the childless worker 
credit
To be eligible for the EITC, 
workers without qualifying 
children and at least one 
parent in married families 
with children must work at 
least 30 hours a week for 
half of the year (26 weeks). 
Married couples with 
children not meeting this 
requirement will not be 
eligible for marriage penalty
relief but can still claim the 
current credit; Non-
custodial parents who are 
not current on child support 
obligations will not be 
eligible for the credit
$8.5 billion
Target of Expansion
Presidential Candidate Proposals
Legislation Introduced in the 110th Congress
Research and Advocacy Proposals
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Author Childless Workers Married Couples
Families with Three or More 
Children Other Cost Estimate
Target of Expansion
Leonard Burman, Elaine Maag, 
and Jeffrey Rohaly (2005)
Extend point at which the credit 
is complete phased out by 10% 
(in lieu of a general expansion 
of phase-out rates by 10%)
Add a third tier with a phase-in 
rate of 50%.  Same phase-in 
range for families with 2 children 
applies, as does the 21.6% phase-
out rate.
Extend the points at which 
the credit is completely 
phased out by 10%
Over 10 years, 
extending the 
phase out points 
would cost $46.2 
billion ($20.6 just 
for married 
couples); Third tier 
would cost $35.3 
over 10 years.  
See Table 9 in the 
paper for year by 
year breakdown
Center for American Progress 
(2007)
Increase the phase-in rate to 20% of 
initial earnings; Make the credit 
available to workers between 18 and 
24 who are not full-time students
Disregard half of the earnings 
of the lower-earning spouse if it 
results in a higher credit
Add a third tier with a phase-in 
rate of 45% 
$22.2 billion (in 
2003 dollars, 
assuming 
employment 
effects)
Peter Edelman, Harry Holzer, 
and Paul Offner (2006)
Increase the phase-in rate to 20% of 
initial earnings, up to the same phase
in limit as filers with one qualifying 
child; Increase phase-out rate to 
15.98; Potentially limit the credit to 
workers between 21 and 45 years of 
age; Alternative option to limit the 
cost of EITC expansion: Cap the 
credit amount for non-custodial 
fathers at the amount they pay for 
child support.  (Roughly 70 percent 
of non-custodial fathers could 
receive an average credit of $1,600.)
Disregard half of the earnings 
of the lower-earning spouse for 
couples in the phase-out range 
of the credit
$4.3 billion for 
childless worker 
expansion ($8.6 
billion without age 
limit); $1 billion for 
marriage penalty 
relief; $1.2 to $2 
billion for non-
custodial father 
credit
Jason Furman/Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities 
(2006)
Double phase-in rate to 15.3%, up to 
the same phase-in limit as filers with 
one qualifying child ($8,580 in 
TY2008), and triple the maximum 
credit
Raise the phase-out points by 
an additional $2,000
Add a third tier with a phase-in 
rate of 50% 
$3 billion for 
childless worker 
expansion 
(including the 
married 
adjustment); $1.5 
billion for the 
marriaged penalty 
relief; $3 billion for 
the 3rd tier 
(keeping other 
EITC parameters 
the same)
Daniel Gitterman, Lucy 
Gorham, and Jessica Dorrance 
(2007)
Double the phase-in rate to 15.3%, 
up to the same phase-in limit as filers 
with one qualifying child ($8,580 in 
TY2008), and triple the maximum 
credit; Lower the minimum age 
requirement from 25 to 21
$4.3 billion
Katie McMinn Campbell and 
Will Marshall (2007)
Double the phase-in rate to 15.3%, 
up to the same phase-in limit as filers 
with one qualifying child ($8,580 in 
TY2008), and triple the maximum 
credit
The expansion for childless 
workers would be coupled 
with larger tax reforms that 
fold the EITC, Child Tax 
Credit, and Child and 
Dependent Care Credit into
one Family Tax Credit.  
Families would receive one 
dollar for every two dollars 
earned, up to $3,500 for 
families with one child, 
$5,200 for two children, 
and $7,000 for three 
children.
$3 billion for 
childless worker 
expansion; $28 
billion total for 
complete reform
Wendell Primus (2006)
Double phase-in rate to 15.3%, up to 
$7,000, and phase-out at $10,000 at 
a rate of 10 percent; Eliminate the 
age requirement for non-custodial 
parents who can show that they paid 
at $400 in child support
The childless worker 
expansion represents one 
possible option to increase 
the EITC for non-custodial 
parents and ideally would 
be paired with a child 
support incentive payment 
or a separate non-custodial 
parent tax credit for 
parents who meet child 
support obligations
not available
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Author Childless Workers Married Couples
Families with Three or More 
Children Other Cost Estimate
Target of Expansion
John Karl Scholz (2007)
Double the phase-in rate to 15.3% 
and double the maximum credit 
amount; Change phase-out rate to 
19.125%; Double the income 
thresholds for childless married 
couples; Lower the age threshold to 
18; Make full-time students ineligible 
for the childless EITC; For taxpayers 
under 30, provide a 25% phase-in 
rate and a 32.15% phase-out rate as 
an early career employment incentive
Double the income thresholds 
for childless married couples
$7.3 billion at full 
participation; $5.8 
billion at 80% 
participation
Carasso, Holzer, Maag, and 
Steuerle (2008)
New individual worker credit equal to 
15.3% of earnings, up to maximum of 
$1,284.  Phase out begins at 
$15,390, ends at $37,783.  Credit for 
family phases out at 5% of joint 
earnings over $50,000.
Reduces phase-in and 
phase-out rates for 1-child 
credit; reduces phase-in 
range for 2-child credit
$30.8 billion
U.S. Conference of Mayors 
(2007)
Quadruple the maximum benefit for 
childless, single adults
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 to connect low-income filers to the credit, and to educate lawmakers and the 
general public about the benefits of the EITC for their families and communities. 
To that end, this section presents new research findings on how the 
current EITC, and proposals to expand the credit, would benefit workers and 
families in each of the nation’s 100 largest metro areas.  These findings reflect 
analysis generated by a new Brookings Institution tax model, based on microdata 
from the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS).  Unlike the data 
sources that undergird most other tax models, which provide estimates at the 
national level, the ACS provides a sufficient sample size to model EITC eligibility 
for workers and families within individual large metropolitan areas (see Box 1 for 
a brief account of the methodology; the Technical Appendix posted on the 
Brookings website provides a more detailed description of the tax model). 
BOX 1.  METROTAX: A NEW METROPOLITAN-FOCUSED FEDERAL INCOME TAX MODELa
The metropolitan area-specific estimates in this report derive from a new 
model constructed by the Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program using Public 
Use Microdata (PUMS) from the 2005 American Community Survey (ACS). The 
model is a static simulation used to estimate federal individual income tax filers, 
income tax liability, and eligibility for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) under 
current law and proposed expansions. 
The ACS is an annual national survey conducted by the U.S. Census 
Bureau encompassing roughly 3 million residents in 1.3 million households, or 
roughly 1 percent of the population.b  It provides data on a number of socio-
economic and demographic characteristics useful for estimating EITC eligibility, 
such as age, marital status, family composition, and income by source.  Its large 
sample size affords an advantage over smaller surveys like the Current 
Population Survey, and permits us to examine sub-national geographies 
including cities, counties, metropolitan areas, and states. 
Using both the ACS PUMS housing and population records, the analysis 
examines household relationships (e.g., spouse, child, other relative, roommate) 
and marital status. Using that information, and IRS information on filing 
thresholds, tax filing units are identified and assigned a filing status (non-filer, 
married couple filing jointly, head of household, married filing separately, and 
single). 
Based on household relationships, filing status, age, and income, the 
model then determines likely dependents both for tax filing and EITC eligibility 
purposes.  The routine to estimate tax filers and filing units was adapted from 
work performed at the Census Bureau and at the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy 
Center.c  Additionally, the model examines filing units headed by foreign-born 
persons to estimate legal status.  Non-citizen low earners and their dependents 
must be legal immigrants with Social Security numbers valid for employment in 
order to be eligible for the credit.d
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 Several caveats to the analysis should be noted:  
• The ACS is a mostly self-reported survey, so populations can be 
underrepresented, overrepresented, or misrepresented, and incomes may be 
under-reported compared to what is reported on tax returns.e  All results are 
subject as well to sampling and non-sampling error; confidence intervals are 
not reported in this paper but are discussed further in the Technical Appendix 
• Some data needed to affirmatively establish EITC eligibility, such as the 
presence of children in the home for more than 6 months during the tax year, 
and limitations on investment income, are not reported completely in the ACS.  
The ACS also lacks information necessary to estimate tax liability accurately, 
such as deductions from income for health and retirement contributions, is not 
available in the ACS.  Future iterations of the model will attempt to adjust for 
these items; one result is that the current analysis makes no estimate of the 
effects of the refundable portion of the Child Tax Credit, claimed by many of 
the same families who benefit from the EITC 
• Estimates of EITC eligibility from the ACS model should not be compared to 
actual IRS EITC payments, at any level of geography, to calculate EITC 
participation rates.  To calculate an EITC participation rate, one must match 
data that establish eligibility for the credit to data that identify whether those 
same eligible filers claimed the creditf 
• Because the model is static, the estimates presented here reflect the effects 
of current law and proposals as they would have affected metropolitan tax 
filers in 2005.  Changes in population and the economy since then, as well as 
changes in behavior that may be induced by changes in tax law, are not 
reflected in this analysis 
• The model is an eligibility model, rather than one designed to predict actual 
program participation.  Actual increases in the number of filers receiving the 
EITC under these proposals, and in EITC dollars received, will depend upon 
the rates at which eligible (and ineligible) workers and families participate in 
the program 
Despite possible measurement error, the results derived from the 
MetroTax model offer a reasonably robust snapshot of probable tax filers and 
EITC eligibility at the metropolitan and state levels.g  For the nationwide effects of 
these proposals, readers should refer to estimates generated by more complete, 
sophisticated models such as those operated by the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy 
Center.h 
a For more details, see the expanded Technical Appendix on the Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program 
website, www.brookings.edu/metro  
b For general background on the ACS, see www.census.gov/acs/www  
BROOKINGS · June 2008 30
 c Amy O’Hara, “New Methods for Simulating CPS Taxes” (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004); Jeff Rohaly, Adam 
Carasso, and Mohammed Adeel Saleem, “The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model: 
Documentation and Methodology for Version (0304)” (Washington: Urban Institute, 2004). 
d The routine to estimate foreign-born tax filers’ legal status is based on work by Jeff Passel and others; see 
Jeff Passel, Jennifer Van Hook, and Frank Bean, “Estimates of the Legal and Unauthorized Foreign-Born 
Population for the United States and Selected States, based on Census 2000 (Sabresystems Inc., 2004). 
e Kirby G. Posey, Edward Welniak, and Charles Nelson, “Income in the American Community Survey: 
Comparisons to Census 2000.” Paper prepared for the American Statistical Association Meetings, San 
Francisco, CA, 2003. 
f Alan Berube, “Earned Income Credit Participation—What We (Don’t) Know” (Washington: Brookings 
Institution, 2005) 
g For instance, the correlations at the metropolitan level between tax filers and EITC-eligible filers estimated 
by the MetroTax model, and tax returns and EITC recipients reported by the IRS, are 0.999. 
h See Tax Policy Center, “Overview of the Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model” (2007). 
This paper focuses on the metropolitan impacts of these proposals here 
for a few reasons.80  First, the EITC is essentially a labor market program.  It 
subsidizes wages, and thereby promotes labor market participation and work 
effort.  It is thus instructive to analyze the credit’s effects within individual labor 
markets, which correspond most closely with metropolitan areas.  Second, the 
EITC is arguably even more “metro” given the continued suburbanization of 
working poverty.  About half the increase in EITC participation from 2000 to 2005 
occurred in suburbs of the nation’s large metropolitan areas.81  Third, as labor 
and media markets, metro areas represent a common locus for 
public/private/nonprofit partnerships aimed at boosting take-up of the EITC 
among eligible workers and families.82
These reasons noted, the benefits of the current EITC, and proposals to 
expand it explored below, would by no means be limited to the 100 largest 
metropolitan areas.  In fact, data from the most recent tax year (2005) reflect that 
tax filers in large metro areas are somewhat less likely to receive the EITC than 
their counterparts in smaller metro areas and rural areas.  Indeed, rural areas of 
the South show the highest rates of EITC receipt in the country.83  Yet proposals 
to strengthen the EITC would provide much-needed help to residents in many 
major metro areas, who bear some of the highest and fastest-rising costs for 
necessities like housing and child care.  In the context of a slowing economy, 
such proposals would also provide a useful fiscal jolt to the metro areas where 
low-income filers are geographically concentrated, as the benefits of the EITC 
dollars multiply through regional and sub-regional economies.84  (Results for all 
100 metro areas can be found in Appendix Tables A and B; results for all U.S. 
states and some central cities can be found at www.blueprintprosperity.org.) 
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 1. In 2005, nearly 14 million tax filers living in the nation’s 100 largest 
metro areas were eligible for Earned Income Tax Credits totaling $23 
billion. 
The nation’s 100 largest metro areas were home to an estimated 13.8 
million EITC-eligible tax filers in 2005.  That represents about 16 percent of their 
estimated 86 million tax filers that year.  Overall, those workers and families were 
eligible to claim EITC amounts totaling $25.1 billion, or an average of more than 
$1,800 per filer. 
As noted above, the amount of EITC for which a tax filer is eligible varies 
by the number of qualifying children claimed.  Currently, families with one or 
more children can claim much larger credits than workers without children.  
Childless workers can only qualify for the EITC over a much smaller range of 
income, up to about $12,500 in 2008.  In the 100 largest metros, a sizable 
number of low-income workers without qualifying children—an estimated 2.5 
million—were eligible for the credit in 2005, about 18 percent of all EITC eligible 
filers (Figure 4).  However, they were able to claim a much smaller proportion—2 
percent—of overall EITC dollars.  The average credit for childless workers in the 
top 100 metros was about $240 in 2005, versus $1,660 for families with one 
child, and $2,600 for families with two or more children. 
Consistent with research analyzing the regional distribution of credit 
receipt, metropolitan areas in the southern states and in California’s Central 
Valley exhibit among the highest shares of their tax filers qualifying for the EITC 
(Table 5).85  The metropolitan areas with 20 percent or more of their filing 
populations eligible for the credit include places like El Paso and San Antonio in 
Texas; Augusta, New Orleans, Baton Rouge, Jackson, Memphis, and 
Greensboro elsewhere in the South; and Bakersfield and Fresno in California.  
Those with low shares of filers eligible for the EITC include a few large metros 
with wealthy suburbs, such as Boston, San Francisco, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and 
Washington.  Nonetheless, these metro areas still have large absolute numbers 
of low-income workers and families who qualify for the credit. 
In many of the metropolitan areas analyzed, state and local EITCs provide 
a further boost to eligible taxpayers’ incomes.86  In 39 of the top 100 metro areas, 
families qualify for a state (and in some cases, local) version of the EITC that 
“piggybacks” on the federal credit.87  An estimated 4.9 million lower-income 
taxpayers in these 39 metro areas are eligible for an additional $1.4 billion via 
these supplemental credits.  The estimated average benefit for qualifying filers 
varies widely, from a low of $57 per family in Durham, NC (where the state EITC 
is 3.5 percent of the federal credit), to a high of $549 in the Albany, NY area 
(where the state EITC is 30 percent of the federal credit). 
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FIGURE 4. 
Childless workers make up 18% of EITC-eligible filers in the 100 largest
metro areas, but are eligible for just 2% of EITC benefits
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Source: Brookings Institution analysis of Internal Revenue Service data
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TABLE 5. 
Metro Areas in the South and California's Central Valley Have
the Highest Shares of Their Filers Qualifying for the EITC
Metro Areas with Highest and Lowest Shares of Tax Filers Qualifying for EITC, 2005
Metro Area Tax Filers EITC-eligible % Eligible
Ten Highest Shares
El Paso, TX 253,178 85,694 33.8
Bakersfield, CA 288,332 75,674 26.2
Fresno, CA 344,293 88,973 25.8
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC 199,586 47,251 23.7
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 624,497 144,190 23.1
San Antonio, TX 774,421 177,579 22.9
Baton Rouge, LA 312,414 71,551 22.9
Jackson, MS 201,318 45,417 22.6
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 520,017 114,062 21.9
Greensboro-High Point, NC 335,461 71,926 21.4
Ten Lowest Shares
Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA 239,898 31,183 13.0
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 1,403,636 170,616 12.2
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 746,320 87,700 11.8
Des Moines, IA 193,631 22,521 11.6
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT 541,122 62,304 11.5
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 2,148,049 243,968 11.4
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 1,955,605 219,944 11.2
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 397,735 42,674 10.7
Madison, WI 220,849 23,262 10.5
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD 2,383,640 236,976 9.9
100 largest metro areas 85,525,140 13,840,624 16.2
Source: Brookings Institution MetroTax model
34
 2. Taken together, three proposals to expand the EITC would benefit an 
estimated 8.4 million filers in the 100 largest metro areas, boosting 
their credit amounts by $6.4 billion. 
While the federal tax code does help many lower-income families a great 
deal via the EITC, it could do more for certain segments of the low-wage worker 
population, as outlined above.  This section examines the impacts of three 
proposals to expand the EITC on taxpayer eligibility and benefits in the 100 
largest metro areas (see Box 2 for a summary of each).88
BOX 2: THREE PROPOSALS TO STRENGTHEN THE EITC 
This section examines the impact of three proposals to strengthen the 
EITC for certain workers and families.  It presents estimates, based on 2005 
data, on the number of filers who would benefit from these proposals, and the 
additional EITC dollar amounts for which they would qualify as a result.  Data are 
presented variously for the nation’s 100 largest metro areas in the aggregate; the 
United States as a whole; and individual metro areas.  The three proposals, 
described further below, would: 
• Triple the maximum EITC for low-income, childless workers to about $1,300 
in tax year 2008, double the rate at which the credit phases in, and raise the 
maximum income level at which filers can receive the credit from $12,880 to 
$19,200 
• Allow married couples to exclude one-half of a second earner’s income when 
calculating the EITC, effectively extending the income range over which these 
couples can receive the maximum EITC amount, and making equal-earning 
couples with one child eligible for the credit at incomes up to about $50,000 
• Create an additional “tier” in the credit for families with three or more 
qualifying children, boosting the credit phase-in rate from 40 percent to 50 
percent, and the maximum credit amount in tax year 2008 for these families 
by about $1,500 
This section also estimates the “bump” filers would receive in state and 
local EITC benefits if these federal EITC changes were adopted.  State and local 
EITC parameters as of tax year 2007 are used to develop these estimates.  
As noted in Box 1, these estimates do not incorporate the effects of 
possible behavioral changes that would result from the tax changes outlined.  
They may thus understate the ultimate impacts if, for instance, people respond to 
an enhanced EITC for childless workers by joining the labor force, or spouses in 
low-income married couples increase their work effort in response to the 
opportunity to exclude half their income for purposes of figuring the EITC. 
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 Childless workers 
In tax year 2008, the maximum EITC available to workers without 
qualifying children is $438, for those with incomes between roughly $6,000 and 
$7,000.  The small credit relieves a portion of payroll tax burdens for these 
workers, but does little beyond that to help them meet their day-to-day costs of 
living. 
In response, policymakers, researchers, and some presidential candidates 
have advanced proposals to greatly expand the EITC for childless workers.89  
Several of these proposals would double the rate at which the credit phases in, 
from 7.65 percent to 15.3 percent.90  In addition, many of these proposals would 
widen the income range over which workers are eligible for the credit. 
To assess the impacts of this proposal on workers in large metro areas, 
this section models a proposal that would, in 2008, boost the maximum EITC for 
childless workers to $1,313, and begin to phase out the credit at $10,620 (see 
Figure 5).91  In doing so, it would effectively triple the size of the childless worker 
credit, and make such workers with incomes of up to $19,200 eligible for the 
EITC.  
Nearly 4.1 million taxpayers in the 100 largest metropolitan areas would 
benefit from this proposal, receiving a larger EITC or becoming newly eligible for 
the credit (under current law, roughly 2.6 million taxpayers in these metros qualify 
for the childless worker credit).  From $237 under current law, the average credit 
from which these low-income workers would benefit would roughly triple, to $705.   
The total amount of credit available to childless workers in the 100 largest 
metro areas would grow considerably, from $605 million under current law to 
$2.9 billion under the proposal.  That represents a roughly 9 percent increase in 
the total EITC (for families of all sizes) available to be claimed by residents of 
these areas.  Among the areas that would experience the greatest increases in 
EITC benefits are older industrial metros with less vibrant labor markets, such as 
Springfield, MA; Buffalo, NY; Syracuse, NY; and Pittsburgh, PA (Table 6).  Many 
of these are the same metro areas that show low rates of employment among 
less-educated young males (Table 2), and part-time and low-wage employment 
may also be more prevalent there.  Other metro areas with large populations of 
younger and/or single low-income workers, such as Madison, WI; Portland (ME 
and OR), and Boise, ID, would see significant boosts in EITC receipt as well. 
Dual-earner married couples 
As described above, researchers have noted that the current structure of 
the EITC may provide a financial disincentive to marriage.  Similarly, the credit 
might also dissuade a non-working spouse in a lower-income family from 
entering the labor market, or increasing his/her earnings. 
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FIGURE 5. 
Expanding the EITC for childless workers would boost eligibilty and average credit amount
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Source: Brookings Institution analysis
37
TABLE 6.  
Different Large Metro Areas Would Benefit Most from the Three Proposals to Expand the EITC
Metro areas experiencing largest estimated increase in EITC benefits from three proposals to expand the EITC, 2005
Metro Area
Filers Amount ($1000s) Filers
Amount 
($1000s) # Benefiting*
Benefit Amount 
($1000s)
$ Increase 
(%)
Increase the credit for workers without qualifying children
Madison, WI 23,262 36,052 29,016 43,633 13,963 7,581 21.0
Springfield, MA 50,523 84,001 59,062 97,443 21,887 13,442 16.0
Portland-South Portland-Biddeford, ME 39,849 57,912 45,358 66,626 17,327 8,714 15.0
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 93,109 151,482 106,537 174,122 38,103 22,640 14.9
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA 159,750 258,266 181,993 296,340 67,463 38,074 14.7
Syracuse, NY 49,063 79,192 56,594 90,583 20,129 11,391 14.4
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 212,067 341,939 241,842 389,693 85,961 47,754 14.0
Boise City-Nampa, ID 36,709 65,827 43,189 74,944 15,820 9,117 13.8
Pittsburgh, PA 163,085 268,981 185,688 305,787 63,064 36,806 13.7
Knoxville, TN 50,862 85,216 58,799 96,789 19,744 11,574 13.6
100 largest metro areas 13,840,624 $25,117,272 15,372,786 $27,388,770 4,074,139 $2,271,498 9.0%
Allow second earners in married couples to deduct half their earnings for calculating the EITC
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 48,693 99,696 53,567 110,533 11,989 10,836 10.9
Salt Lake City, UT 78,706 140,075 83,676 151,742 15,975 11,668 8.3
Durham, NC 31,202 50,191 33,687 54,348 5,227 4,157 8.3
Fresno, CA 88,973 187,356 94,155 202,673 17,522 15,318 8.2
Des Moines, IA 22,521 38,906 25,268 42,002 4,971 3,096 8.0
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA 61,327 103,273 65,730 110,260 9,720 6,987 6.8
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 457,026 870,982 483,772 929,848 80,835 58,867 6.8
Tulsa, OK 86,339 155,266 90,310 165,681 16,620 10,415 6.7
Greensboro-High Point, NC 71,926 126,133 76,245 134,502 10,012 8,368 6.6
Boise City-Nampa, ID 36,709 65,827 40,126 70,179 6,767 4,352 6.6
100 largest metro areas 13,840,624 $25,117,272 14,489,341 $26,418,126 1,788,172 $1,300,854 5.2%
Create additional EITC tier for families with three or more children
Lancaster, PA 29,893 52,401 30,475 60,244 8,783 7,843 15.0
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 337,174 660,726 350,845 759,253 104,920 98,527 14.9
Fresno, CA 88,973 187,356 91,136 213,779 27,736 26,423 14.1
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 279,329 512,409 287,252 583,386 72,109 70,976 13.9
Salt Lake City, UT 78,706 140,075 81,540 158,582 19,732 18,508 13.2
Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA 31,183 53,268 32,068 60,157 7,888 6,890 12.9
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 189,335 349,196 195,553 394,092 48,892 44,896 12.9
Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land, TX 450,206 899,890 460,991 1,015,429 124,883 115,540 12.8
New Haven-Milford, CT 53,244 90,738 54,620 102,264 12,153 11,526 12.7
San Antonio, TX 177,579 343,534 182,696 386,884 46,310 43,351 12.6
100 largest metro areas 13,840,624 $25,117,272 14,140,748 $27,754,753 2,901,235 $2,637,481 10.5%
Three proposals combined
Madison, WI 23,262 36,052 29,988 48,894 19,785 12,842 35.6
Boise City-Nampa, ID 36,709 65,827 48,582 87,840 27,835 22,013 33.4
Durham, NC 31,202 50,191 38,329 66,756 28,808 16,565 33.0
Portland-South Portland-Biddeford, ME 39,849 57,912 47,560 76,819 111,687 18,907 32.6
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA 159,750 258,266 192,153 341,183 20,997 82,917 32.1
Salt Lake City, UT 78,706 140,075 97,355 184,175 53,828 44,101 31.5
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA 61,327 103,273 78,335 135,693 42,407 32,419 31.4
Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA 31,183 53,268 39,105 69,325 123,620 16,058 30.1
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 279,329 512,409 337,760 666,684 186,264 154,275 30.1
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 137,672 233,654 168,615 303,546 20,328 69,892 29.9
100 largest metro areas 13,840,624 $25,117,272 16,398,315 $31,562,493 8,388,510 $6,445,221 25.7%
* Filers experiencing an increase of $1 or more in the EITC for which they qualify
Source: Brookings Institution MetroTax model
Current Law EITC Proposed EITC
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 One proposal to address these shortcomings in the credit would allow 
married couples to disregard one-half of the lower-earning spouses’ income for 
purposes of calculating the EITC, if doing so would result in an increased EITC 
for the family.92  This would extend the income range over which the credit 
“plateaus,” and lower the rate at which the credit phases out (Figure 6).  Working 
spouses with equal incomes could then earn the EITC up to a family income of 
about $55,000.  Researchers have noted that such a “married earnings 
deduction” is an effective and targeted way to alleviate marriage penalties in the 
EITC.93  This section models the effects of this policy change on EITC eligibility 
and benefits available to families in the 100 largest metro areas.94
Overall, an estimated 1.8 million filers in the 100 largest metros would 
receive a larger EITC under this proposal.  About 650,000 of these filers would 
become newly eligible for the credit as a result of the expansion.  Altogether, 
allowing secondary earners to exclude half their income for purposes of 
calculating the EITC would provide families in the 100 largest metro areas an 
additional estimated $1.3 billion in tax savings.  Among the large-metro families 
that would benefit, their average EITC would increase by more than $700. 
The $1.3 billion in additional EITC would boost the total amount of credit 
for which families in the top 100 metros are eligible by 5 percent.  Metropolitan 
areas in which a larger share of existing eligible filers are dual-earner couples, or 
those housing many dual-earner couples who would become eligible for the 
credit under the proposal, would experience above-average increases in the 
amount of EITC for which their families qualify (Table 6).  These include 
somewhat more mid-sized metro areas such as Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-
Ventura, CA; Salt Lake City, UT; Fresno, CA; and Des Moines, IA.   
Families with three or more children 
A third limitation in the EITC noted earlier concerns its treatment of large 
families, who are much more likely to experience poverty than families with one 
or two children.  Recognizing this, some experts have called for the federal 
government to establish an additional “tier” in the credit for families with three or 
more children.95  This section models the effects of creating such a tier, in which 
the EITC phases in at a higher rate for these larger families, reaching a higher 
maximum amount, then phasing out at the same rate as for families with two 
children (Figure 7). 
Across the 100 largest metro areas, we estimate that 2.9 million filers 
would benefit from a new segment of the EITC dedicated to larger families.  A 
relatively small number (300,000) would become newly eligible for the credit, due 
to the expansion of the income range over which the EITC for these families 
would phase out.  Most of the additional $2.6 billion in estimated benefits from 
the proposal in the 100 largest metro areas would accrue to taxpayers already 
receiving the credit for families with two or more qualifying children.  For eligible 
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FIGURE 6.
Allowing Second Earners to Deduct Half Their Income When Calculating the EITC Would 
Reduce Tax Burdens on Lower-Income Working Married Couples
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FIGURE 7.
Creating a larger credit for families with three or more children would increase the maximum 
EITC by almost $1,500 
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 families with three or more children, their average credit would rise by about 
$650, from $2,630 to $3,280. 
The additional $2.6 billion in EITC for which filers in the 100 largest metros 
would qualify as a result of this proposal would amount to more than a 10 percent 
increase over the credit amount for which they are currently eligible.  Several 
metro areas with significant lower-income Latino populations would receive even 
more significant boosts, because of the larger average family sizes that prevail 
there (Table 6).  These include Riverside-San Bernardino, CA; Fresno, CA; 
Phoenix, AZ; San Diego, CA; Houston, TX; and San Antonio, TX.  (Recall that 
immigrants must be U.S. citizens, or have temporary or permanent legal status, 
in order to qualify for the EITC.)  Smaller areas with larger low-income families, 
such as Lancaster, PA; Harrisburg, PA; and New Haven, CT, would receive a 
significant boost in tax benefits, too. 
Combination of three proposals 
Given the range of issues these EITC expansions are designed to 
address, and the differing low-income populations they would benefit, it is 
instructive to see how the 100 largest metro areas would gain from the 
enactment of all three proposals together. 
Proposals to substantially increase the childless worker credit, boost the 
credit for dual-earner couples, and create an additional credit tier for large 
families overlap with one another in small ways.  Some childless married 
couples, for instance, could benefit from the first two proposals.  Similarly, dual-
earner couples with three or more qualifying children could benefit from both the 
second and third proposals.  Therefore, the three EITC expansions together 
would act as more than a simple arithmetic sum of the individual proposals. 
Taken together, these three proposals would result in new or increased 
EITC eligibility for an estimated 8.4 million tax filers in the nation’s 100 largest 
metro areas.  About 2.5 million would become eligible for the credit as a result, 
while the remainder would qualify for a larger credit amount.  For these tax filers, 
the expansions would boost the size of the EITC in their metro areas by about 26 
percent, or $6.4 billion.  A little under 60 percent of the total benefits nationwide 
from the three proposals combined ($11.0 billion) would accrue to taxpayers in 
these large metropolitan areas. 
Because somewhat different types of workers and families would benefit 
from each of the three proposals, the metro areas that would benefit most are 
themselves a diverse group (Table 6).  Again, several with larger childless-
worker populations among their EITC recipients would receive significant boosts 
in their benefit levels, such as Madison, WI; Boise, ID; and Portland (both ME 
and OR).  A couple with lower-income Latino populations, including San Diego, 
CA; and Las Vegas, NV, also rank among those with the largest projected 
increases in EITC dollars received.  And a couple of mid-sized metro areas in 
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 other parts of the United States, such as Omaha, NE; and Harrisburg, PA, rank 
high for projected EITC increases, as does Salt Lake City, UT.  Overall, the 100 
largest metro areas would see the amount of EITC for which their tax filers 
qualify rise anywhere from 16 percent to 36 percent under these three proposals. 
State/local benefits 
Proposals to boost the federal EITC are implicitly federalist, in that they 
generate a response at the state level in the form of expanded state EITCs, 
nearly all of which “piggyback” on the federal credit in some way.96
The enactment of all three proposals outlined above would enable workers 
and families in 39 of the 100 largest metro areas to claim an estimated additional 
$324 million through state and local EITCs, on top of the $1.4 billion for which 
they currently qualify.  An estimated 815,000 workers and families would become 
newly eligible for state and local credits as a result of federal EITC changes.  By 
far, the largest aggregate “bump” would accrue to taxpayers in the greater New 
York area, who would benefit from—depending on their location—state EITCs in 
New York and New Jersey, and a local EITC in New York City, amounting to an 
additional $145 million overall (Table 7). 
Benefits beyond the 100 largest metro areas 
As noted above, while this paper focuses on the EITC as a particularly 
important tool for ensuring more inclusive metropolitan economic growth, the 
credit’s benefits extend well beyond the nation’s largest urban areas.  Indeed, the 
fact that the federal EITC is not adjusted for regional cost-of-living differences 
makes it an even more powerful support for smaller areas of the country, which 
typically have lower wage structures.  The MetroTax model results indicate that 
about 58 percent of filers who benefit from the three proposals examined here, 
and 58 percent of the increased credit dollars, would accrue to the 100 largest 
metro areas in the United States (Table 8).  This means that smaller metropolitan 
and non-metropolitan areas would capture fully 42 percent of the benefits from 
these expansions, or $4.6 billion in 2005.  The benefits of the proposal to expand 
the EITC for families with three or more children skew somewhat more towards 
large metro areas, while those from the dual-earner deduction proposal would 
favor other parts of the country.  Only the increased state and local earned 
income credits that would follow from the federal proposals would clearly 
advantage the 100 largest metro areas over other places, as these credits tend 
to cluster in higher-cost areas of the nation. 
3. The three proposals would provide important benefits to working-
poor families, workers earning very low wages, and households 
facing severe housing-cost burdens in major metropolitan areas. 
Under current law, the EITC is available to childless workers with incomes 
of less than $13,000, and to families with children and incomes of generally less 
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TABLE 7.
Federal EITC Expansions Would Provide Filers in Several Large Metro Areas With Significant Boosts in State/Local EITCs
Metro Areas With Largest Estimated Dollar Increase in State/Local EITC Benefit Eligibility Resulting from Federal Enactment of All Three Proposals
Metro Area
State/Local 
EITC Filers
Amount 
($1000s)
State/Local 
Filers
Amount 
($1000s) $ Increase $ Increase (%)
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA 1,162,829 650,660 1,323,053 795,400 144,740 22.2
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD 142,472 63,294 168,001 81,457 18,163 28.7
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 641,932 62,120 751,832 77,702 15,582 25.1
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 358,368 62,661 416,809 77,731 15,070 24.1
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 214,771 54,275 250,107 67,827 13,552 25.0
Baltimore-Towson, MD 174,053 60,807 199,348 73,835 13,027 21.4
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 92,957 45,445 112,618 58,025 12,580 27.7
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 98,619 43,198 104,479 55,408 12,210 28.3
Rochester, NY 77,457 39,696 96,700 51,243 11,547 29.1
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE 94,163 38,365 109,765 46,364 7,999 20.8
39 Large Metro Areas with State/Local EITCs 4,911,133 $1,466,473 5,725,673 $1,803,058 $336,585 23.0%
Source: Brookings Institution MetroTax model
Current Law EITC Proposed EITC
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TABLE 8. 
Expanding the EITC Would Benefit Millions of Workers and Families
in the Largest Metropolitan Areas, and Nationwide
Taxpayers benefiting, and additional benefits (federal and state) from EITC expansion proposals, 2005
Proposal
100 metros Rest of U.S. Nation
100-metro 
share
Triple maximum credit for childless 
workers 4,074 3,039 7,113 57.3
Allow second earners to exclude 
half of income 1,789 1,488 3,277 54.6
Expand credit for families with 3 or 
more children 2,901 1,828 4,729 61.3
All 3 proposals combined* 8,389 6,062 14,451 58.1
Proposal
100 metros Rest of U.S. Nation
100-metro 
share
Triple maximum credit for childless 
workers $2,271 $1,725 $3,996 56.8
Allow second earners to exclude 
half of income $1,301 $1,031 $2,332 55.8
Expand credit for families with 3 or 
more children $2,637 $1,639 $4,276 61.7
All 3 proposals combined* $6,445 $4,587 $11,032 58.4
Proposal
100 metros Rest of U.S. Nation
100-metro 
share
Triple maximum credit for childless 
workers $116 $52 $168 69.0
Allow second earners to exclude 
half of income $60 $41 $101 59.4
Expand credit for families with 3 or 
more children $137 $62 $199 68.8
All 3 proposals combined* $324 $161 $485 66.8
*3-proposal combination estimates differ from sums of individual proposals because some taxpayers
benefit from more than one proposal
Source: Brookings Institution MetroTax model
Taxpayers benefiting (1000s)
Additional Federal EITC ($millions)
Additional State EITC ($millions)
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 than $40,000.  The proposed expansions outlined in this section would all have 
the practical effect of increasing not only EITC credit amounts for currently 
eligible recipients, but also expanding the range of income over which filers can 
claim the credit, and thus making somewhat higher-income workers and families 
eligible. 
In light of the dual effects of these proposals, it is useful to ask how much 
they benefit workers and families who face the greatest challenges, including 
those with low incomes, those earning low wages, and those paying a 
considerable share of their income for housing costs.  This section provides 
some answers to these questions by examining the profile of filers projected to 
benefit from each of the proposals, and the three proposals combined, in the 100 
largest metro areas. 
Families with low incomes 
To assess how well the proposals reach families who have low incomes, 
this section examines the share of filers benefiting from the proposals (that is, 
receiving at least a $1 increase in the EITC for which they qualify) who have 
incomes below 150 percent of the applicable poverty level.97
If all three proposals outlined above were enacted, an estimated 71 
percent of workers and families who would benefit have incomes below 150 
percent of the applicable federal poverty threshold—similar to the 77 percent of 
EITC-eligible filers under current law who have such low incomes.  Families with 
three or more children, who are much more likely to experience working poverty 
than families with one or two children, are especially well targeted by this 
standard.  Fully 86 percent of large-metro families benefiting from the proposal to 
create an additional EITC tier for families with three or more children have 
incomes below 150 of poverty.  This is also true for three-quarters of those filers 
who would benefit from the proposal to help childless workers, and 43 percent of 
those benefiting from the relief for dual-earner married couples. 
The share of filers who gain from the combination of the three proposals 
who have incomes below 150 percent of poverty ranges between 58 percent and 
78 percent across the 100 largest metro areas.  That share depends not only on 
the incomes earned by EITC-eligible residents of these areas, but also the mix of 
filers likely to benefit most from the proposals.  Thus, the mix of metro areas in 
which the largest shares of filers reached have incomes below 150 percent of 
poverty include a few in which larger families make up a significant share of 
EITC-eligible filers (e.g., El Paso, TX and Albuquerque, NM); and several where 
most of the filers helped would be very low-income childless workers (e.g., 
Toledo, OH; Lansing, MI; Springfield, MA; and Baltimore, MD) (see Table 9). 
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TABLE 9. 
EITC Expansions Would Provide Much-Needed Help to Low-Income Families,
Low-Wage Earners, and Families with Severe Housing Cost Burdens
Metro areas in which largest share of tax filers benefit* from three EITC proposals combined, by characteristic, 2005
Share with incomes below 150 percent of poverty level
Metro area Filers benefiting
With incomes < 
150% poverty % Low-income
Trenton-Ewing, NJ 8,630 6,756 78.3
El Paso, TX 46,377 35,695 77.0
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA 115,610 88,409 76.5
Toledo, OH 28,225 21,475 76.1
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 20,849 15,823 75.9
Springfield, MA 35,313 26,726 75.7
Albuquerque, NM 46,916 35,399 75.5
Portland-South Portland-Biddeford, ME 28,541 21,456 75.2
Baltimore-Towson, MD 89,707 67,314 75.0
Madison, WI 20,078 14,966 74.5
100 largest metro areas 8,328,667 5,856,232 70.3%
Share with effective wages below $9.00 an hour**
Metro area Filers benefiting
With wages < 
$9.00 an hour % Low wage
Madison, WI 20,078 8,952 44.6
Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL 26,873 11,641 43.3
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 69,408 29,664 42.7
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 79,590 32,739 41.1
El Paso, TX 46,377 19,043 41.1
Dayton, OH 36,262 14,657 40.4
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 20,849 8,407 40.3
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 61,016 24,556 40.2
Kansas City, MO-KS 81,891 32,937 40.2
Akron, OH 35,163 14,082 40.0
100 largest metro areas 8,384,085 2,818,549 33.6%
Share in households with housing costs equal to at least 50% of household income
Metro area Filers benefiting
In HHs w/ 
housing costs > 
50% of income
% w/ severe 
housing cost 
burdens
Trenton-Ewing, NJ 8,442 5,671 67.2
Madison, WI 19,785 11,360 57.4
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 46,838 25,234 53.9
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 141,397 70,739 50.0
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA 599,228 284,284 47.4
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 99,591 45,518 45.7
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 137,086 62,281 45.4
Denver-Aurora, CO 91,522 41,577 45.4
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 366,333 166,346 45.4
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 123,620 55,215 44.7
100 largest metro areas 8,104,453 3,098,527 38.2%
* Filers experiencing an increase of $1 or more in the EITC for which they qualify
** Effective wage calculated as total filer unit earnings divided by product of weeks worked and usual hours worked per week
Source: Brookings Institution MetroTax model
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 Families earning low wages 
The three proposals would also do a fairly good job of reaching workers 
who earn low wages.  To examine this question, an effective wage for all tax 
units is calculated based on their total earnings, divided by an estimate of the 
hours they worked, for the previous year.  The analysis focuses on tax units that 
had effective wages in 2005 below $9.00 an hour, a common standard for 
identifying low-wage workers (see Section II). 
Rather than simply subsidizing workers who earn good wages and have 
low incomes because they work part-time or part-year, the EITC proposals 
analyzed benefit many filers who work in low-wage jobs.  Thirty-six percent of all 
tax units who benefit from the current-law EITC have earnings below $9.00 an 
hour, as would 34 percent of all filers who would gain from the enactment of the 
three proposals outlined above.  Childless workers who benefit are, not 
surprisingly, the most likely to earn low wages (48 percent); a significant share 
(30 percent) of filers helped by the proposal for families with three or more 
children work in low-wage jobs as well. 
The metro areas in which these proposals would reach above-average 
shares of low-wage workers are thus a mix of those in which low-income 
childless workers predominate among EITC recipients, and those in which low-
wage work is especially plentiful (Table 9).  The ten with the highest shares of 
these workers are all located in the South and Midwest. 
Families with severe housing-cost burdens 
A third group that policymakers may wish to target through an EITC 
expansion is families who face high and rising costs for housing.  According to 
the National Low Income Housing Coalition, the number of households facing a 
severe housing cost burden—that is, paying at least half of their income for 
housing costs—increased by 23 percent nationwide between 2001 and 2005, 
and even more rapidly for those households not in the lowest part of the income 
distribution.98  Previous research has established that the EITC is an effective 
tool for helping alleviate housing-cost burdens for lower-income working 
families.99
On this count, the three proposals to expand the credit collectively reach 
an even higher percentage of burdened households than the existing EITC.  An 
estimated 38 percent of those who would benefit from the expansions live in 
households that pay more than half their income for housing costs (compared to 
35 percent for the current EITC). Both childless workers (45 percent) and families 
with three or more children (43 percent) helped by these proposals are especially 
likely to face such cost burdens. 
The metro areas in which the largest shares of filers benefiting from the 
proposals are severely burdened by housing costs include, not surprisingly, 
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 several of the nation’s largest metro areas (Table 9).  These dot the West Coast 
(San Jose, San Francisco, San Diego), the East Coast (Trenton, New York, 
Boston), and the nation’s interior (Madison, Denver, Chicago).  In these metro 
areas, 45 percent or more of all filers helped by the three proposals are in 
households that pay at least half their income for housing costs.  This is perhaps 
not surprising, since high rental prices in these cities and suburbs mean that 
many families confront significant issues related to housing costs.  Yet the figures 
also serve as a reminder that the EITC is a useful vehicle for tackling affordable 
housing problems that stem from low incomes—an argument advanced by other 
work in the Blueprint policy series.100
In this way, proposals to expand the EITC are very much metropolitan-
focused in helping families to afford better housing.  As noted above, however, 
the credit’s delivery method is not particularly well-suited to helping families cope 
with the challenge of meeting these monthly costs.  
VII. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD EXPAND THE EITC AND DEVELOP A NEW 
WAY FOR RECIPIENTS TO ACCESS THE CREDIT’S PROCEEDS THROUGHOUT THE YEAR 
In light of the significant and growing economic problems facing low-wage 
workers across the United States, the next administration and Congress should 
build on the success of the Earned Income Tax Credit, enabling the credit to do 
more for workers and families who face particular challenges: 
• Very low-income childless workers, who benefit from only a small EITC, and 
who are taxed further into poverty via federal payroll and income taxes under 
current law; 
• Dual-earner couples, who because of the EITC’s phase-out may face a 
considerable economic disincentive to marry, or to have a second spouse in a 
married couple join the labor force; and 
• Working families with three or more children, who receive no more assistance 
from the EITC than do families with two children, even though they are twice 
as likely to have incomes below 150 percent of poverty 
In addition to expanding the credit for these types of workers and families, 
the next administration and Congress should consider overhauling the Advance 
EITC, and creating a more viable periodic payment option through which workers 
and families could access the proceeds of the EITC throughout the year.101  For 
an estimated 38 percent of EITC-eligible workers and families in the 100 largest 
metro areas, the credit represented at least 20 percent of their gross annual 
income in 2005.  Clearly, it would benefit society to devise some way for families 
to access at least a portion of that significant fraction of their annual income 
periodically throughout the year. 
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 Principles for designing such a new option are detailed in an 
accompanying Brookings discussion paper by Steve Holt, and outlined briefly 
here:102
• Make periodic payment an “opt-in” to start.  Research has pointed to the 
advantages of presumptive participation (or “opt-out”) design for pensions.  It 
would be beneficial, however, to operate this new periodic payment and 
evaluate its performance for a few tax seasons before making it the default 
option for filers.  The design for a new system should aim to give recipients a 
viable choice between lump-sum and periodic payments.  This may lead to 
low initial take-up, but could provide useful feedback for revising the design 
over time. 
• Retain the IRS as the administrative agency.  The success of the EITC in 
reaching eligible families owes much to its inclusion in the tax code.  Most 
EITC recipients are not now the clients of other social welfare agencies, 
where benefit enrollment procedures are more burdensome and carry greater 
stigma.  The IRS should remain the lead agency in administering a new 
periodic EITC payment system.  This would inevitably increase EITC 
administrative costs, so the system’s design should, to the maximum extent 
possible, build on existing IRS processes to minimize additional expenditures. 
• Make payments directly to recipients, not through employers.  Workers—in 
the United States and abroad—appear to have little appetite for interacting 
with their employers to provide the information needed to establish tax credit 
eligibility and calculate payments accurately.  In other countries, direct deposit 
to a financial institution account is most often the only payment vehicle for in-
work benefits, and has several advantages over processing paper checks.  
Direct deposit could be the best method for making periodic EITC payments 
here, if the many unbanked households who receive the credit were provided 
viable options for receiving their benefits in this way.103 
• Take steps to minimize repayment obligations.  In general, the American tax 
system is retrospective; actual taxes due (and, by extension, eligibility for 
credits) are not known until the end of the year.  A periodic payment 
mechanism for the EITC would likely involve some prospective prediction of 
eligibility tied to current income and family circumstances.  Minimizing the risk 
of having to repay EITC proceeds due to prediction errors is a critical element 
of periodic payment design.104  Some steps to consider include: (a) creating a 
“safe harbor” from repayment for workers who request periodic payments in 
good faith; (b) adopting some tolerance for overpayments that result from 
data chosen for administrative simplicity;105 (c) providing opportunities for 
taxpayers to communicate to the IRS, including via their tax return, their 
expectation of, or changes in, EITC eligibility; and (d) limiting the amount of 
expected EITC that can be claimed throughout the year, perhaps to 50 
percent.  Alternatively, the EITC could be paid out on a periodic basis 
retrospectively, based on the previous years’ earnings, effectively eliminating 
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 the possibility that recipients might have to repay the proceeds.106  However, 
this would de-link receipt of the EITC from current income needs, and 
potentially deliver the credit to workers and families who no longer have low 
incomes, or prevent newly low-income filers from accessing the credit when 
they need it most.107 
• Balance competing priorities in payment frequency.  A periodic payment 
system focused on helping households with everyday needs would argue for 
weekly or biweekly disbursement (as in other countries).  But such frequent 
payments would ignore EITC recipients’ demonstrated desire for some 
degree of accumulation, and would increase administrative costs.  Building on 
the IRS’ quarterly payments schedule for estimated taxes could represent a 
middle ground that enhances recipients’ liquidity, preserves their ability to 
accumulate modest credit amounts for larger purchases or investments, and 
reduces new processing costs for the IRS. 
As the next administration and Congress debate proposals to increase the 
EITC and enhance the refundability of other tax credits, they should carefully 
consider the evidence on the shortcomings of the current Advance EITC, the 
case for a renewed approach to periodic payments, and emerging policy options 
that would make the credit a more effective tool in helping low-income 
households meet their ongoing needs. 
What it would cost 
Based on estimates from the Brookings MetroTax model, the three EITC 
expansions recommended above would have increased the amount of credit 
eligible to be claimed by $11.0 billion nationwide in 2005, or 26 percent of 
estimated eligible claims that year.  Applying an equivalent percentage increase 
to estimated program size in 2008 yields an estimated cost of approximately 
$12.3 billion.108  This estimate is generally in line with estimates produced by 
other researchers and policymakers advancing similar proposals.  
The ultimate cost of administering a new periodic payment system for the 
EITC would depend on the specifics of system design, and the share of eligible 
taxpayers who chose to receive payments periodically.  The United Kingdom 
government spent an estimated £587 million in 2006-07 to administer its Child 
and Working Tax Credits, or roughly 3 percent of the total credits paid that 
year.109  However, a periodic payment system for the EITC would cost much less 
as a share of program expenditures if the system were made optional for 
recipients (versus mandatory in the UK), and if payments were made on a 
quarterly basis (versus weekly or monthly in the UK).110
Even if these are judged to be modest expenditures in light of the pressing 
problems facing low-income workers and families, the nation’s precarious fiscal 
situation nonetheless obligates the next administration and Congress to consider 
ways to offset these costs that do not add to the long-run budget deficit.111   
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 Events on the tax policy horizon may create opportunities to ensure that 
proposals to expand the EITC do not worsen the federal fiscal picture.  Most 
notably, the major income tax cuts enacted in 2001—including across-the-board 
rate reductions—are due to expire in 2010.  This will set off a furious debate in 
the next two years about which of these cuts should be extended, which should 
be allowed to expire, and how to provide relief to the millions more Americans 
who have become subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) as a result of 
these cuts.  Overall, these cuts disproportionately benefited high-income 
taxpayers, and exacerbated the trend in after-tax income inequality.112  With 
mounting challenges facing low-wage workers and families, and the wealthiest 
taxpayers now holding a larger share of income than at any time since the Great 
Depression, the next Congress and administration should consider enacting an 
EITC expansion as part of broader efforts to restore greater progressivity to the 
federal tax code.113
The expiration of these tax cuts would, on balance, make the tax code 
more progressive, but it would also affect EITC recipients in two important 
ways.114  First, it would eliminate the extended “plateau” range in the EITC for 
married filers, which acts to reduce some of the marriage penalties imposed by 
the structure of the credit.  Second, it would do away with the refundable portion 
of the Child Tax Credit, which provides additional help to many low- and 
moderate-income filers with children who have earnings in the “phase-out” range 
of the EITC.  The dual-earner deduction and large-family proposals evaluated in 
this paper are designed to help many of the same families assisted by these 
provisions.  While these existing provisions should be retained post-2010, it may 
also make sense to help families through the EITC now who could be affected 
adversely by the expiration of, or changes to, these provisions in the future. 
Responses to possible objections 
Some might raise objections to these proposals for going too far, not going far 
enough, or missing the point.  Possible criticisms, and responses, include: 
• The proposals are too small to make much of a difference.  A 26 percent 
overall increase in the size of the EITC, and a new periodic payment option, 
would admittedly only go so far toward boosting stagnant wages and 
ameliorating rising income inequality.  However, the state of the U.S. 
economy and the attendant federal fiscal environment likely preclude a much 
more considerable increase in the size of the credit in the near term.  The size 
of the overall increase notwithstanding, these proposals do envision a 
significant boost in the EITC for very low-income childless workers, equivalent 
to a tripling of the credit.  Moreover, the analysis here has shown that the 
proposals under consideration are relatively well-targeted toward low-income 
families, those with low wages, and those facing the burdens of high housing 
costs.  To be sure, the EITC expansion contemplated here should augment, 
rather than substitute for, other policies to assist working families cope with 
the rising costs of health care, child care, and housing. 
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 • The EITC has too high an error rate and should not be increased.  The 
federal EITC is sometimes criticized for having a high rate of “overpayments;” 
that is, credits claimed by taxpayers who are technically ineligible for the 
EITC.  These arguments against the credit overlook a few key facts, however.  
First, the actual level of EITC overpayments is in doubt.  Although the IRS 
estimates that overpayments accounted for 23 to 28 percent of EITC amounts 
paid in tax year 2004, evidence suggests that the methods used to derive that 
estimate suffer from numerous weaknesses and very likely lead the IRS to 
overstate error in credit claims.115  Second, the IRS has made numerous 
administrative improvements in recent years that have likely led to a further 
reduction in EITC payment errors.  Third, the IRS and federal policymakers 
are considering ways to simplify the EITC that would make it less error-prone 
in the future.  For these reasons, the EITC retains strong support among 
current and former IRS and Treasury Department officials.116  Further 
reductions in the EITC error rate could be achieved by simplifying the credit’s 
complex rules.117 
• An expanded EITC for childless workers should include additional rules to 
ensure  that eligible claimants are “deserving.”  With maximum EITC amounts 
available to childless workers with incomes between $8,600 and $10,600 
under the proposal examined here, some argue that additional rules are 
necessary to prevent voluntary part-time or part-year workers from benefiting 
from the expanded credit.118  Some other countries, such as Ireland, New 
Zealand, and the United Kingdom impose these types of requirements.119  
Others argue that for non-custodial parents, who represent a significant share 
of individuals potentially eligible for such an EITC, the expanded credit should 
only be extended to those who are current on their child-support 
obligations.120 As noted earlier, New York and Washington, D.C. have 
expanded their EITCs specifically for non-custodial parents who are meeting 
these obligations.  At the U.S. federal level, however, eligibility requirements 
regarding work effort and child-support payments are unlikely to be 
enforceable or verifiable.  No administrative data capture information on hours 
worked.121  States maintain child-support data, at varying levels of quality, but 
these data are not aggregated in a timely or reliable fashion at the national 
level.  New investments to gather these data and use them in EITC 
enforcement would likely add considerably to EITC administrative costs.  
Furthermore, conditioning the EITC on work effort (either hours per week, or 
weeks per year) could potentially penalize those individuals at the margins of 
the labor market who are only able to find part-time or seasonal work, and 
thus need even more the work support that an expanded credit would 
provide.   
• States, rather than the federal government, should address the issue by 
creating or expanding their own EITCs.  States can and should do more to 
help low-income working families through their own tax codes.  Map 1 shows 
that 19 states that have income taxes lack a state EITC altogether, 3 have 
only nonrefundable credits, and a few provide refundable EITCs at only very 
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 small percentages of the federal credit.  However, due to states’ more limited 
fiscal capacity, and the balanced budget requirements under which they 
operate, there is a natural limit to what states can do through their tax codes 
on behalf of low-income working families.  State EITCs cannot by themselves 
substitute for meaningful efforts at the federal level to ensure a decent income 
floor for all working Americans.  State and local EITCs do remain a smart and 
effective way to augment federal antipoverty efforts, especially in regions of 
the country where working families face above-average costs of living. 
• Taxpayers don’t want periodic EITC payments.  The very low usage of the 
current Advance EITC does not, on its own, prove that a better-designed 
periodic payment system for the EITC would not appeal to many lower-
income taxpayers.  The Advance EITC suffers from several shortcomings, 
including involving employers in the enrollment and disbursement process, 
requiring re-enrollment each year, providing only a small proportion of the 
credit to workers with two or more children, and offering no mechanism for 
modest accumulation of periodic payments.  EITC recipients’ liquidity 
constraints, demonstrated in their use of RALs and their application of most 
credit dollars to pay bills, strongly argue for developing a more functional 
option that would allow filers access to a significant share of their anticipated 
credit a few times during the year.  The design of a new periodic payment 
option must, however, take full account of recipients’ understandable 
reluctance to pay back credits at the end of the year due to unforeseeable 
changes in circumstance. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The uneven character of the recent economic expansion, the widening 
gap between wages and prices, and the precarious outlook for the American 
economy in the near term compel federal policymakers to explore anew 
strategies to assist the nation’s low-income workers and families.  In doing so, 
they should build upon the proven success of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 
arguably our nation’s most potent tool for alleviating poverty, promoting work, 
and securing more inclusive economic growth.  The EITC expansion and 
modernization recommended here will, of course, go only part of the way toward 
ensuring more inclusive economic growth.  To fully realize that goal, the federal 
government should accompany these changes to the EITC with stronger 
commitments to raise the skills of American workers (the subject of other papers 
in the Blueprint Policy Series) and to provide them with access to needed 
supports like health care, child care, and retirement savings.  As a major tax bill 
takes shape in the next administration and Congress, however, the EITC should 
rank high among the policy instruments deployed to widen the benefits of 
economic growth, and to soften the blows of a sluggish economy on U.S. 
workers.  
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APPENDIX A.
EITC-Eligible Tax Units and Credit Amounts Under Current Law and Expansion Proposals, 100 Largest Metropolitan Areas, 2005
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Nation 23,154,501 17.7% 41,814,945 1,806 7,112,735 2,687,115 3,996,297 9.6% 3,277,044 1,196,311 2,331,860 5.6% 4,729,441 495,598 4,266,327 10.2% 14,450,518 4,513,651 11,032,332 26.4%
100 Largest Metro Areas 13,840,624 16.2% 25,117,272 1,815 4,074,139 1,532,162 2,271,498 9.0% 1,788,762 648,717 1,300,853 5.2% 2,901,235 300,124 2,631,966 10.5% 8,388,510 2,557,691 6,445,220 25.7%
Akron, OH 54,002 16.5% 95,357 1,766 19,319 8,178 11,635 12.2% 7,093 1,651 5,123 5.4% 10,222 826 9,874 10.4% 35,163 11,758 27,797 29.2%
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 55,057 14.1% 100,695 1,829 13,996 5,323 8,634 8.6% 3,988 1,799 2,568 2.5% 9,476 758 9,236 9.2% 26,874 8,247 20,991 20.8%
Albuquerque, NM 73,544 20.4% 129,085 1,755 26,160 8,186 15,028 11.6% 8,404 2,058 5,387 4.2% 13,544 989 11,971 9.3% 46,916 11,529 33,887 26.3%
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ 49,590 13.8% 97,955 1,975 14,067 6,951 7,719 7.9% 6,453 2,623 5,230 5.3% 6,632 743 5,761 5.9% 27,091 11,660 20,129 20.5%
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 359,487 16.7% 627,082 1,744 100,302 40,044 58,102 9.3% 48,628 19,416 33,532 5.3% 70,991 5,702 64,214 10.2% 212,965 67,831 161,204 25.7%
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC 47,251 23.7% 90,400 1,913 12,260 3,576 6,834 7.6% 4,917 1,842 3,578 4.0% 9,930 477 9,338 10.3% 26,752 6,686 20,148 22.3%
Austin-Round Rock, TX 106,753 15.5% 195,531 1,832 39,107 17,213 21,029 10.8% 15,672 5,412 9,540 4.9% 26,037 3,739 22,386 11.4% 74,347 25,813 54,954 28.1%
Bakersfield, CA 75,674 26.2% 158,144 2,090 17,067 6,727 9,340 5.9% 12,405 3,465 9,497 6.0% 18,770 1,851 17,117 10.8% 46,055 13,501 38,191 24.1%
Baltimore-Towson, MD 174,950 14.5% 304,037 1,738 50,999 17,495 29,867 9.8% 13,093 4,752 7,732 2.5% 30,702 2,138 25,867 8.5% 89,772 24,551 65,132 21.4%
Baton Rouge, LA 71,551 22.9% 141,099 1,972 16,514 6,694 9,331 6.6% 9,784 3,013 5,859 4.2% 12,381 766 11,271 8.0% 37,016 10,882 27,496 19.5%
Birmingham-Hoover, AL 92,505 20.2% 174,952 1,891 27,132 11,706 14,070 8.0% 12,448 4,413 9,863 5.6% 17,325 1,112 14,217 8.1% 53,866 17,322 39,058 22.3%
Boise City-Nampa, ID 36,709 16.6% 65,827 1,793 15,820 6,480 9,117 13.8% 6,767 3,417 4,352 6.6% 7,795 1,127 6,984 10.6% 30,045 11,873 22,013 33.4%
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 243,968 11.4% 409,642 1,679 80,980 26,644 42,351 10.3% 23,657 9,199 18,350 4.5% 41,623 5,195 36,776 9.0% 139,722 40,413 100,128 24.4%
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 42,674 10.7% 68,611 1,608 10,525 2,629 5,392 7.9% 4,917 1,218 3,919 5.7% 8,975 856 8,367 12.2% 24,291 5,653 18,991 27.7%
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 93,109 17.4% 151,482 1,627 38,103 13,428 22,640 14.9% 8,905 3,147 6,017 4.0% 14,393 2,347 12,471 8.2% 60,025 19,712 41,936 27.7%
Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL 40,149 15.0% 77,136 1,921 12,006 4,347 7,399 9.6% 4,662 1,626 3,575 4.6% 8,360 232 7,453 9.7% 24,425 7,093 19,472 25.2%
Charleston-North Charleston, SC 59,820 20.8% 111,684 1,867 17,674 6,420 10,012 9.0% 5,340 1,981 2,993 2.7% 8,518 582 8,252 7.4% 31,104 9,661 22,495 20.1%
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC 122,149 17.5% 227,110 1,859 36,927 15,720 20,029 8.8% 19,888 6,524 14,465 6.4% 24,470 2,100 22,276 9.8% 79,076 26,662 59,718 26.3%
Chattanooga, TN-GA 37,869 18.6% 67,878 1,792 13,739 6,929 8,198 12.1% 5,267 2,433 3,229 4.8% 7,342 448 6,446 9.5% 25,970 10,175 18,331 27.0%
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 648,086 15.7% 1,181,506 1,823 170,568 61,982 94,117 8.0% 78,115 26,021 60,745 5.1% 145,715 16,577 129,076 10.9% 380,585 110,101 297,345 25.2%
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN 154,331 17.2% 296,374 1,920 44,504 16,803 23,527 7.9% 15,085 5,432 8,816 3.0% 26,738 2,720 23,636 8.0% 84,048 25,579 57,735 19.5%
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 174,387 17.8% 297,047 1,703 59,997 22,636 36,719 12.4% 14,906 4,805 8,735 2.9% 30,229 2,134 25,612 8.6% 102,623 30,945 73,318 24.7%
Colorado Springs, CO 36,429 15.0% 65,187 1,789 11,665 4,994 6,543 10.0% 5,165 1,501 3,435 5.3% 6,761 819 5,809 8.9% 22,881 7,544 16,493 25.3%
Columbia, SC 42,428 17.0% 78,760 1,856 15,154 6,363 8,673 11.0% 4,752 2,060 4,324 5.5% 9,428 1,026 7,705 9.8% 28,278 9,791 21,617 27.4%
Columbus, OH 125,579 16.7% 222,211 1,769 41,237 14,387 22,082 9.9% 14,664 6,430 9,275 4.2% 22,370 2,253 19,375 8.7% 76,828 24,535 54,127 24.4%
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 457,026 18.3% 870,982 1,906 116,942 46,914 64,023 7.4% 80,835 26,746 58,867 6.8% 111,362 12,716 102,305 11.7% 287,195 86,582 234,570 26.9%
Dayton, OH 61,412 16.5% 105,820 1,723 21,772 6,578 11,607 11.0% 6,667 2,695 3,504 3.3% 9,183 516 7,811 7.4% 36,262 9,713 24,113 22.8%
Denver-Aurora, CO 146,982 13.4% 251,297 1,710 49,040 20,040 26,673 10.6% 23,725 9,319 15,948 6.3% 27,629 2,739 25,900 10.3% 95,415 32,915 70,174 27.9%
Des Moines, IA 22,521 11.6% 38,906 1,728 8,083 3,606 4,576 11.8% 4,971 2,747 3,096 8.0% 3,432 371 3,216 8.3% 15,108 6,485 11,236 28.9%
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 360,029 17.6% 626,620 1,740 107,041 38,151 61,185 9.8% 32,142 12,776 25,029 4.0% 73,392 5,939 59,504 9.5% 203,599 58,490 150,687 24.0%
Durham, NC 31,202 16.5% 50,191 1,609 12,805 4,286 6,798 13.5% 5,227 2,485 4,157 8.3% 5,177 203 4,588 9.1% 21,918 7,127 16,565 33.0%
El Paso, TX 85,694 33.8% 190,168 2,219 13,177 5,122 8,120 4.3% 12,542 3,507 9,311 4.9% 23,568 2,578 19,300 10.1% 46,377 11,781 38,755 20.4%
Fresno, CA 88,973 25.8% 187,356 2,106 16,529 7,177 9,033 4.8% 17,522 5,182 15,318 8.2% 27,736 2,163 26,377 14.1% 56,199 14,292 52,601 28.1%
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI 55,750 18.0% 104,396 1,873 17,404 8,034 9,799 9.4% 7,945 1,837 4,796 4.6% 13,136 1,325 12,617 12.1% 37,435 11,813 28,766 27.6%
Greensboro-High Point, NC 71,926 21.4% 126,133 1,754 19,435 7,386 12,045 9.5% 10,012 4,319 8,368 6.6% 13,561 1,060 11,959 9.5% 42,406 13,872 35,210 27.9%
Greenville, SC 63,714 19.9% 112,078 1,759 21,380 8,040 11,896 10.6% 8,163 2,892 6,147 5.5% 8,515 1,023 7,179 6.4% 37,245 12,798 26,157 23.3%
Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA 31,183 13.0% 53,268 1,708 10,055 4,644 5,885 11.0% 3,433 1,854 2,447 4.6% 7,888 885 6,872 12.9% 21,589 7,922 16,058 30.1%
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT 62,304 11.5% 106,840 1,715 16,935 7,249 9,208 8.6% 5,288 2,549 4,295 4.0% 10,841 1,216 10,553 9.9% 32,763 11,419 24,619 23.0%
Honolulu, HI 65,384 16.2% 113,711 1,739 15,954 6,194 9,019 7.9% 8,528 4,793 6,362 5.6% 13,212 1,642 11,694 10.3% 37,476 13,615 28,972 25.5%
Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land, TX 450,206 20.6% 899,890 1,999 101,776 40,823 58,992 6.6% 74,888 23,237 49,307 5.5% 124,883 10,785 115,378 12.8% 281,865 77,973 233,984 26.0%
Indianapolis, IN 108,867 15.5% 186,262 1,711 37,593 13,766 17,894 9.6% 13,582 4,350 9,560 5.1% 22,115 3,619 21,341 11.5% 70,044 22,560 49,488 26.6%
Jackson, MS 45,417 22.6% 84,578 1,862 10,398 4,372 6,097 7.2% 7,146 2,716 4,936 5.8% 9,285 258 8,149 9.6% 25,778 7,330 19,149 22.6%
Jacksonville, FL 97,185 17.5% 160,805 1,655 35,016 15,517 19,312 12.0% 12,662 4,160 8,824 5.5% 13,931 2,525 11,983 7.5% 60,964 23,790 41,686 25.9%
Kansas City, MO-KS 129,673 15.9% 230,779 1,780 41,434 15,927 22,747 9.9% 19,028 6,027 12,300 5.3% 27,475 2,141 24,355 10.6% 81,891 23,444 62,077 26.9%
Knoxville, TN 50,862 18.3% 85,216 1,675 19,744 7,937 11,573 13.6% 8,666 3,438 5,507 6.5% 7,976 1,540 6,399 7.5% 35,784 13,268 24,777 29.1%
Lancaster, PA 29,893 14.0% 52,401 1,753 9,850 4,882 4,529 8.6% 3,613 1,092 2,361 4.5% 8,783 582 7,836 15.0% 21,693 6,999 15,560 29.7%
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 31,946 16.4% 55,730 1,745 12,266 4,077 7,402 13.3% 2,767 849 2,477 4.4% 5,916 214 5,611 10.1% 20,849 5,800 16,081 28.9%
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 137,672 17.0% 233,654 1,697 43,226 18,197 24,934 10.7% 17,205 8,357 13,404 5.7% 28,745 3,726 27,983 12.0% 86,128 30,943 69,892 29.9%
Lexington-Fayette, KY 16,580 13.5% 25,020 1,509 7,258 2,812 3,291 13.2% 2,111 916 1,593 6.4% 2,562 73 2,392 9.6% 11,355 3,981 7,376 29.5%
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 52,582 18.7% 98,383 1,871 17,747 8,598 10,418 10.6% 5,988 2,799 4,458 4.5% 10,122 1,049 9,304 9.5% 33,487 13,259 25,140 25.6%
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 1,009,237 18.1% 2,030,696 2,012 235,698 86,435 133,125 6.6% 163,437 53,438 134,143 6.6% 270,343 27,454 254,378 12.5% 621,018 166,508 542,152 26.7%
Louisville, KY-IN 96,586 18.5% 156,666 1,622 34,193 11,612 19,456 12.4% 11,096 4,885 9,245 5.9% 16,921 1,449 13,780 8.8% 59,966 18,568 44,682 28.5%
Madison, WI 23,262 10.5% 36,052 1,550 13,963 5,754 7,581 21.0% 2,061 340 1,422 3.9% 3,982 42 3,551 9.8% 20,078 6,726 12,842 35.6%
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 114,062 21.9% 207,593 1,820 39,200 17,533 22,700 10.9% 9,109 3,018 6,960 3.4% 23,591 2,279 21,244 10.2% 69,433 24,066 52,778 25.4%
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL 416,987 17.2% 754,108 1,808 124,857 50,423 69,982 9.3% 68,011 27,312 49,442 6.6% 70,324 6,703 64,778 8.6% 252,221 85,910 193,189 25.6%
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 120,938 17.2% 227,332 1,880 34,691 12,372 20,342 8.9% 9,495 4,512 4,562 2.0% 28,006 1,463 24,429 10.7% 70,191 18,861 51,799 22.8%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 170,616 12.2% 293,941 1,723 59,442 23,147 30,622 10.4% 22,141 10,390 15,686 5.3% 39,253 5,151 36,928 12.6% 115,595 39,407 87,125 29.6%
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro, TN 104,469 17.1% 185,683 1,777 34,059 15,292 19,950 10.7% 11,484 4,778 7,533 4.1% 17,517 1,889 15,028 8.1% 62,120 23,260 44,180 23.8%
New Haven-Milford, CT 53,244 13.7% 90,738 1,704 13,735 4,561 8,625 9.5% 4,781 1,963 2,948 3.2% 12,153 1,376 11,518 12.7% 29,481 8,280 23,528 25.9%
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 144,190 23.1% 268,046 1,859 47,514 22,733 26,267 9.8% 10,956 4,145 7,760 2.9% 22,206 950 17,887 6.7% 79,590 28,349 53,104 19.8%
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA 1,165,554 14.0% 2,135,062 1,832 292,649 92,950 161,393 7.6% 120,181 40,169 90,679 4.2% 232,360 21,468 213,663 10.0% 619,331 160,753 478,439 22.4%
Oklahoma City, OK 112,620 20.5% 195,039 1,732 37,500 13,744 20,552 10.5% 16,939 5,837 11,185 5.7% 21,479 2,791 19,157 9.8% 72,226 22,653 53,701 27.5%
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA 61,327 15.3% 103,273 1,684 21,484 10,028 10,636 10.3% 9,720 4,403 6,987 6.8% 14,952 1,575 12,022 11.6% 44,630 17,008 32,419 31.4%
Orlando, FL 153,266 17.2% 292,671 1,910 46,404 19,553 24,513 8.4% 26,092 10,427 19,186 6.6% 30,616 2,425 29,744 10.2% 100,826 35,083 76,508 26.1%
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 48,693 14.2% 99,696 2,047 11,449 5,713 6,019 6.0% 11,989 4,874 10,836 10.9% 12,126 2,007 11,530 11.6% 32,602 12,042 29,621 29.7%
Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL 44,494 17.6% 76,585 1,721 16,680 6,396 8,243 10.8% 5,119 1,557 3,459 4.5% 5,040 379 4,146 5.4% 26,873 9,237 16,702 21.8%
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE 398,052 15.0% 716,394 1,800 109,957 37,401 62,209 8.7% 34,844 15,056 25,263 3.5% 81,550 7,071 74,592 10.4% 220,318 61,967 167,183 23.3%
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 279,329 15.9% 512,409 1,834 87,853 35,205 49,301 9.6% 41,881 14,946 29,972 5.8% 72,109 7,923 70,884 13.8% 191,986 58,431 154,275 30.1%
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Pittsburgh, PA 163,085 15.4% 268,981 1,649 63,064 22,603 36,808 13.7% 18,416 8,283 12,637 4.7% 24,573 2,819 22,703 8.4% 105,240 36,607 74,953 27.9%
Portland-South Portland-Biddeford, ME 39,849 15.0% 57,912 1,453 17,327 5,509 8,713 15.0% 3,827 1,536 3,357 5.8% 7,919 638 6,431 11.1% 28,541 7,711 18,907 32.6%
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA 159,750 16.5% 258,266 1,617 67,463 22,243 38,073 14.7% 24,025 7,555 15,947 6.2% 30,831 2,518 26,839 10.4% 115,610 32,403 82,917 32.1%
Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY 40,583 14.0% 67,680 1,668 12,377 5,163 7,070 10.4% 3,076 1,405 1,427 2.1% 7,011 1,010 7,434 11.0% 22,076 7,880 16,534 24.4%
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA 105,666 14.2% 185,426 1,755 36,952 14,659 18,894 10.2% 9,554 2,864 8,465 4.6% 18,570 2,048 16,922 9.1% 62,236 20,122 45,344 24.5%
Raleigh-Cary, NC 63,530 15.1% 108,835 1,713 18,436 6,344 10,440 9.6% 9,535 3,312 5,512 5.1% 11,273 1,288 9,504 8.7% 37,393 11,064 27,305 25.1%
Richmond, VA 68,451 14.2% 115,115 1,682 21,678 8,019 12,147 10.6% 9,971 4,445 5,382 4.7% 10,438 907 9,716 8.4% 41,443 13,805 28,814 25.0%
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 337,174 21.1% 660,726 1,960 69,310 24,322 36,997 5.6% 47,090 15,857 37,439 5.7% 104,920 13,671 98,394 14.9% 207,589 54,083 179,796 27.2%
Rochester, NY 77,807 16.8% 132,319 1,701 28,700 11,525 16,781 12.7% 11,360 5,007 7,404 5.6% 13,812 2,703 12,450 9.4% 51,526 18,991 38,490 29.1%
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA 143,564 15.6% 256,602 1,787 39,252 11,839 21,632 8.4% 16,190 6,618 13,170 5.1% 31,159 3,249 29,504 11.5% 81,985 21,383 65,772 25.6%
St. Louis, MO-IL 203,050 16.6% 368,745 1,816 58,779 21,404 32,348 8.8% 24,840 12,390 15,775 4.3% 38,234 3,568 33,294 9.0% 119,149 39,207 85,458 23.2%
Salt Lake City, UT 78,706 18.9% 140,075 1,780 23,838 9,957 11,886 8.5% 15,975 4,970 11,668 8.3% 19,732 2,834 18,438 13.2% 55,806 18,649 44,101 31.5%
San Antonio, TX 177,579 22.9% 343,534 1,935 41,079 16,555 22,593 6.6% 28,918 8,102 21,647 6.3% 46,310 5,117 43,228 12.6% 104,943 30,627 89,216 26.0%
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 189,335 14.6% 349,196 1,844 56,660 20,767 33,490 9.6% 28,586 8,756 21,222 6.1% 48,892 6,218 44,726 12.8% 126,525 35,397 103,630 29.7%
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 219,944 11.2% 367,045 1,669 82,072 27,959 46,797 12.7% 24,868 8,248 18,205 5.0% 44,555 6,633 38,184 10.4% 146,019 43,316 106,149 28.9%
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 87,700 11.8% 159,278 1,816 21,994 6,649 12,488 7.8% 9,872 3,527 7,378 4.6% 19,225 4,116 16,687 10.5% 48,185 13,787 38,781 24.3%
Sarasota-Bradenton-Venice, FL 43,790 13.2% 74,267 1,696 16,283 6,176 9,571 12.9% 5,539 1,812 3,376 4.5% 7,164 312 6,211 8.4% 27,670 8,951 20,138 27.1%
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre, PA 52,355 18.4% 98,621 1,884 17,654 6,737 8,820 8.9% 6,406 3,039 4,576 4.6% 9,895 1,073 9,950 10.1% 34,495 12,231 24,569 24.9%
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 212,067 13.9% 341,939 1,612 85,961 29,775 47,756 14.0% 27,930 9,524 19,316 5.6% 29,702 4,100 27,253 8.0% 137,458 44,284 98,367 28.8%
Springfield, MA 50,523 15.4% 84,001 1,663 21,887 8,539 13,442 16.0% 5,670 2,767 3,559 4.2% 8,888 434 6,794 8.1% 35,313 11,770 24,870 29.6%
Stockton, CA 51,627 19.2% 102,485 1,985 11,692 5,158 6,531 6.4% 7,828 1,915 5,059 4.9% 12,389 750 10,279 10.0% 30,761 8,678 22,982 22.4%
Syracuse, NY 49,063 17.4% 79,192 1,614 20,129 7,531 11,391 14.4% 4,419 1,776 3,155 4.0% 9,137 1,163 7,477 9.4% 32,717 10,624 22,781 28.8%
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 204,467 16.2% 346,390 1,694 71,010 26,487 40,190 11.6% 26,220 8,851 19,632 5.7% 33,992 3,096 28,272 8.2% 126,499 41,199 91,159 26.3%
Toledo, OH 51,207 18.6% 98,700 1,927 15,396 4,745 8,633 8.7% 5,916 2,355 3,977 4.0% 8,613 546 6,835 6.9% 28,225 7,821 20,111 20.4%
Trenton-Ewing, NJ 20,886 13.2% 34,277 1,641 5,284 1,426 2,849 8.3% 898 192 493 1.4% 2,828 223 2,214 6.5% 8,630 1,841 5,556 16.2%
Tucson, AZ 81,278 19.3% 148,695 1,829 25,887 11,206 14,281 9.6% 10,388 3,422 8,761 5.9% 17,396 997 15,357 10.3% 51,017 15,944 40,183 27.0%
Tulsa, OK 86,339 20.6% 155,266 1,798 27,120 10,659 13,820 8.9% 16,620 3,971 10,415 6.7% 18,430 2,160 17,094 11.0% 59,606 17,724 43,144 27.8%
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 117,634 16.3% 213,162 1,812 31,527 12,931 17,538 8.2% 11,192 5,067 7,808 3.7% 20,324 3,274 19,016 8.9% 62,210 22,052 45,193 21.2%
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD 236,976 9.9% 386,998 1,633 71,398 25,548 37,611 9.7% 29,672 14,057 23,601 6.1% 45,860 6,116 45,866 11.9% 141,399 46,497 107,381 27.7%
Wichita, KS 44,021 17.8% 79,618 1,809 15,208 5,122 8,884 11.2% 6,618 3,079 5,170 6.5% 8,073 2,276 7,238 9.1% 29,671 11,361 22,802 28.6%
Worcester, MA 41,047 13.4% 76,628 1,867 10,869 5,385 6,109 8.0% 3,718 2,172 2,504 3.3% 6,916 813 6,210 8.1% 20,392 7,657 15,324 20.0%
Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA 51,611 19.3% 90,101 1,746 17,843 6,184 9,967 11.1% 4,658 1,913 2,955 3.3% 10,494 654 9,982 11.1% 32,153 9,228 23,886 26.5%
Source: Brookings Institution MetroTax model
*Units "benefit" from an expansion proposal if (A) their EITC credit amount increases; or (B) they become eligible for the EITC under the new parameters
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APPENDIX B.
Share of Tax Units Benefiting from EITC Expansion Proposals* with Selected Characteristics, 100 Largest Metro Areas, 2005
Tax Unit Characteristic:
Increase 
Childless 
Worker Credit
Allow 2nd-
Earner 
Deduction
Increase 
Credit for 
Large 
Families
Combination 
of 3 Proposals
Increase 
Childless 
Worker Credit
Allow 2nd-
Earner 
Deduction
Increase 
Credit for 
Large 
Families
Combination 
of 3 Proposals
Increase 
Childless 
Worker Credit
Allow 2nd-
Earner 
Deduction
Increase 
Credit for 
Large 
Families
Combination 
of 3 Proposals
Nation 74.4% 41.4% 85.6% 68.7% 65.1% 8.0% 34.6% 41.6% 38.8% 16.2% 30.9% 31.5%
100 Largest Metro Areas 75.4% 43.3% 85.7% 70.3% 47.5% 7.4% 30.3% 34.2% 44.7% 22.2% 36.0% 37.2%
Akron, OH 73.4% 47.5% 86.8% 68.7% 51.3% 5.0% 40.6% 40.1% 30.1% 14.3% 34.2% 28.3%
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 68.2% 38.5% 89.3% 69.6% 44.3% 8.6% 36.9% 37.7% 29.8% 15.4% 38.7% 31.3%
Albuquerque, NM 83.6% 33.0% 89.5% 75.3% 47.5% 10.9% 33.4% 37.4% 42.6% 16.7% 23.7% 33.0%
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ 65.0% 39.9% 83.5% 59.1% 45.4% 11.5% 29.2% 32.5% 37.8% 21.6% 36.7% 32.9%
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 77.1% 37.0% 84.8% 68.5% 53.8% 6.7% 28.6% 35.6% 52.7% 19.4% 37.7% 40.3%
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC 78.8% 23.6% 97.1% 72.7% 50.9% 4.0% 35.8% 36.9% 35.8% 6.3% 29.8% 28.6%
Austin-Round Rock, TX 80.8% 45.0% 83.5% 74.0% 50.9% 8.2% 32.0% 37.9% 50.2% 15.4% 29.5% 38.2%
Bakersfield, CA 71.4% 51.5% 89.5% 69.1% 44.4% 4.7% 29.5% 29.2% 35.5% 13.8% 31.1% 28.0%
Baltimore-Towson, MD 74.1% 49.8% 90.1% 74.8% 38.8% 7.0% 32.9% 32.8% 44.0% 29.5% 32.7% 38.0%
Baton Rouge, LA 76.3% 48.9% 89.5% 71.3% 47.0% 4.5% 33.3% 32.3% 37.3% 13.5% 32.3% 29.8%
Birmingham-Hoover, AL 73.2% 37.6% 91.2% 69.9% 50.9% 10.0% 52.8% 42.1% 34.0% 11.3% 33.5% 30.1%
Boise City-Nampa, ID 80.5% 31.5% 83.6% 67.4% 50.1% 4.3% 39.7% 36.7% 46.7% 17.5% 37.0% 35.7%
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 74.9% 44.8% 81.9% 71.3% 40.1% 7.8% 22.3% 30.3% 48.1% 34.6% 44.1% 44.9%
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 78.8% 33.1% 69.8% 63.6% 42.9% 3.2% 19.2% 25.3% 49.9% 44.2% 38.6% 42.8%
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 68.6% 36.1% 84.7% 65.7% 45.3% 2.3% 38.9% 37.6% 44.3% 9.3% 27.8% 35.4%
Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL 69.7% 52.2% 95.6% 71.4% 41.5% 7.2% 30.3% 30.4% 35.2% 29.8% 32.3% 32.3%
Charleston-North Charleston, SC 74.3% 49.5% 90.2% 71.9% 46.6% 3.4% 32.7% 35.4% 38.0% 6.9% 20.2% 28.0%
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC 71.4% 43.3% 87.8% 66.9% 52.8% 11.1% 30.5% 36.2% 44.1% 17.1% 31.4% 33.2%
Chattanooga, TN-GA 79.1% 24.9% 93.7% 70.7% 52.0% 8.2% 26.5% 36.2% 35.0% 2.6% 21.4% 25.2%
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 78.1% 45.0% 85.9% 72.1% 46.8% 7.7% 33.7% 34.2% 50.7% 30.4% 44.1% 44.1%
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN 72.8% 36.8% 85.6% 68.6% 49.8% 7.2% 31.7% 37.3% 42.3% 14.5% 31.2% 34.0%
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 77.4% 40.5% 88.9% 73.3% 50.3% 5.3% 35.6% 40.3% 47.4% 32.7% 49.2% 44.5%
Colorado Springs, CO 74.3% 29.7% 76.3% 64.3% 41.6% 0.0% 26.8% 28.9% 41.7% 21.4% 29.1% 32.9%
Columbia, SC 75.1% 29.8% 85.0% 68.9% 48.5% 0.0% 40.4% 38.6% 44.2% 4.2% 31.5% 34.7%
Columbus, OH 77.7% 36.0% 85.9% 69.8% 53.9% 1.4% 34.8% 38.8% 44.4% 15.6% 28.9% 34.0%
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 81.4% 45.3% 85.7% 71.7% 54.0% 7.4% 30.3% 34.7% 46.6% 15.8% 34.1% 34.5%
Dayton, OH 75.8% 34.8% 86.9% 71.3% 54.3% 6.7% 30.8% 41.1% 42.6% 18.1% 39.9% 36.9%
Denver-Aurora, CO 70.0% 37.3% 84.3% 64.3% 49.3% 3.6% 24.6% 33.0% 49.0% 33.9% 43.0% 44.0%
Des Moines, IA 70.9% 31.6% 72.5% 57.5% 54.2% 14.1% 29.9% 38.1% 41.4% 14.4% 45.1% 32.9%
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 72.8% 40.3% 88.2% 72.0% 43.8% 7.8% 34.4% 35.5% 47.4% 21.8% 42.0% 42.0%
Durham, NC 80.4% 37.3% 92.9% 71.9% 53.4% 8.8% 29.7% 38.2% 42.6% 8.4% 31.6% 33.0%
El Paso, TX 83.1% 58.1% 90.2% 76.7% 57.7% 9.6% 48.2% 41.7% 25.7% 2.2% 22.5% 18.9%
Fresno, CA 73.4% 56.2% 88.9% 72.4% 53.6% 8.3% 36.3% 33.8% 35.5% 15.1% 32.1% 29.0%
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI 69.6% 51.0% 77.6% 65.7% 40.9% 8.0% 23.1% 28.6% 20.5% 11.3% 19.4% 19.5%
Greensboro-High Point, NC 66.6% 29.9% 85.3% 61.0% 52.5% 10.8% 36.4% 37.4% 40.9% 9.9% 20.6% 27.2%
Greenville, SC 71.4% 39.9% 83.1% 64.5% 51.1% 5.7% 37.8% 38.7% 22.9% 8.6% 21.7% 19.1%
Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA 72.0% 32.6% 89.3% 69.7% 42.3% 8.3% 28.2% 31.4% 25.0% 33.3% 23.4% 24.1%
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT 64.0% 16.1% 79.3% 60.0% 38.2% 7.1% 23.9% 28.3% 46.0% 20.9% 34.2% 37.4%
Honolulu, HI 74.7% 31.7% 85.5% 65.2% 50.9% 11.6% 31.1% 34.6% 42.3% 17.0% 20.2% 29.6%
Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land, TX 77.7% 54.2% 89.6% 74.0% 51.9% 9.7% 35.0% 35.4% 44.3% 15.9% 31.9% 32.2%
Indianapolis, IN 69.9% 42.4% 76.2% 64.5% 52.3% 10.0% 29.2% 37.9% 36.9% 16.0% 33.1% 31.6%
Jackson, MS 73.5% 51.9% 85.5% 71.0% 55.6% 6.9% 40.6% 37.4% 32.7% 6.9% 24.9% 23.6%
Jacksonville, FL 71.6% 33.4% 73.2% 62.2% 52.8% 5.4% 33.6% 38.5% 39.9% 10.2% 27.1% 30.8%
Kansas City, MO-KS 75.5% 38.3% 87.0% 69.6% 58.7% 10.0% 29.4% 40.9% 45.8% 14.7% 34.4% 35.3%
Knoxville, TN 70.2% 44.2% 77.1% 63.0% 48.2% 9.6% 23.5% 32.9% 33.2% 8.1% 20.0% 24.0%
Lancaster, PA 69.3% 45.6% 86.2% 69.1% 55.2% 5.6% 34.1% 39.7% 31.5% 6.6% 29.2% 26.8%
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 77.9% 51.0% 92.1% 75.8% 52.0% 23.8% 32.4% 40.9% 46.6% 26.5% 44.7% 43.5%
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 74.2% 39.0% 83.1% 67.8% 46.0% 3.6% 18.3% 29.3% 46.6% 20.1% 32.3% 36.9%
Lexington-Fayette, KY 73.6% 36.4% 85.9% 69.0% 49.9% 0.0% 36.5% 40.0% 36.5% 2.8% 6.1% 25.2%
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 78.1% 35.4% 91.0% 71.6% 53.8% 2.7% 33.2% 38.6% 38.2% 13.5% 36.3% 33.2%
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 77.7% 52.5% 87.8% 73.8% 45.4% 7.4% 30.7% 31.3% 50.3% 23.9% 38.8% 39.7%
Louisville, KY-IN 76.5% 34.7% 83.0% 69.4% 51.4% 5.0% 25.4% 36.6% 42.6% 12.4% 28.4% 33.7%
Madison, WI 75.3% 60.5% 93.6% 74.5% 51.7% 22.1% 34.8% 44.6% 62.6% 52.9% 48.0% 56.8%
Below 150% of the Poverty Level Earning Less than $9.00 an Hour** With Severe Housing-Cost Burdens***
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Below 150% of the Poverty Level Earning Less than $9.00 an Hour** With Severe Housing-Cost Burdens***
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 78.5% 41.5% 80.1% 73.5% 59.9% 7.4% 26.4% 43.3% 42.5% 24.6% 38.5% 37.6%
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL 77.6% 43.2% 86.9% 69.1% 54.1% 8.2% 30.6% 36.3% 45.6% 33.2% 43.4% 41.8%
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 77.2% 33.5% 86.4% 73.5% 43.3% 7.5% 28.5% 33.2% 51.5% 10.7% 33.2% 39.4%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 70.3% 40.7% 81.8% 67.1% 43.3% 9.6% 24.3% 31.4% 37.7% 23.9% 38.1% 35.2%
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro, TN 66.2% 22.9% 82.2% 60.9% 52.3% 5.1% 23.1% 35.3% 37.4% 11.5% 24.2% 28.8%
New Haven-Milford, CT 77.3% 37.6% 79.5% 71.8% 33.7% 3.1% 33.2% 29.1% 51.7% 10.9% 41.4% 41.8%
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 72.1% 35.6% 94.6% 72.1% 51.8% 5.4% 40.1% 42.3% 36.9% 6.0% 34.3% 31.9%
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA 74.6% 44.3% 86.7% 71.6% 42.4% 9.0% 31.1% 32.6% 52.5% 38.6% 44.1% 46.6%
Oklahoma City, OK 78.5% 41.8% 83.7% 70.2% 54.9% 12.6% 33.9% 40.7% 41.8% 7.6% 32.3% 32.2%
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA 69.6% 36.0% 82.9% 63.7% 54.2% 4.5% 28.9% 35.8% 44.4% 10.6% 25.5% 31.2%
Orlando, FL 74.4% 41.9% 85.3% 66.9% 48.8% 5.8% 30.1% 32.4% 39.7% 22.4% 39.7% 34.4%
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 67.8% 44.5% 86.1% 63.8% 37.6% 4.7% 27.5% 25.4% 43.7% 34.9% 43.3% 40.2%
Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL 74.6% 37.4% 92.1% 67.9% 60.0% 3.3% 30.6% 43.6% 46.8% 16.5% 26.0% 36.1%
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE 77.3% 36.4% 87.9% 73.0% 41.0% 6.5% 30.1% 32.1% 49.0% 28.2% 33.8% 40.0%
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 74.9% 42.0% 84.3% 70.1% 47.6% 4.0% 24.0% 30.8% 42.0% 22.0% 26.9% 32.3%
Pittsburgh, PA 69.0% 31.6% 87.1% 64.2% 45.9% 9.5% 31.8% 35.6% 36.2% 7.5% 20.9% 27.9%
Portland-South Portland-Biddeford, ME 79.1% 34.3% 88.4% 75.1% 53.4% 10.6% 22.1% 39.4% 34.9% 18.0% 15.8% 26.8%
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA 82.4% 48.4% 90.4% 76.3% 44.5% 6.5% 28.5% 34.1% 44.5% 28.5% 36.1% 38.6%
Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY 59.7% 50.7% 85.2% 63.7% 38.2% 3.6% 27.4% 29.9% 39.8% 43.5% 49.0% 41.6%
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA 71.1% 38.4% 83.0% 67.8% 45.5% 0.0% 25.7% 34.1% 42.3% 22.6% 31.2% 36.5%
Raleigh-Cary, NC 72.1% 46.1% 82.9% 67.7% 42.0% 16.2% 41.1% 35.0% 33.6% 19.2% 39.9% 33.2%
Richmond, VA 71.9% 31.3% 87.9% 64.4% 50.1% 5.8% 34.7% 35.9% 47.3% 11.4% 21.4% 32.0%
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 75.4% 52.7% 83.5% 72.6% 44.4% 6.1% 23.8% 27.6% 41.1% 25.2% 35.7% 34.8%
Rochester, NY 71.1% 24.0% 72.4% 61.7% 40.9% 3.7% 24.5% 29.5% 44.2% 19.9% 48.9% 38.6%
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA 78.4% 45.3% 84.3% 73.0% 40.0% 7.7% 27.9% 30.6% 49.7% 30.7% 38.6% 42.5%
St. Louis, MO-IL 74.6% 29.5% 86.9% 66.9% 51.4% 4.1% 40.6% 38.1% 37.9% 9.9% 38.7% 32.2%
Salt Lake City, UT 73.1% 40.8% 81.7% 65.0% 59.3% 9.0% 34.2% 38.3% 42.5% 17.8% 24.2% 30.3%
San Antonio, TX 79.8% 52.2% 88.4% 73.9% 54.2% 7.5% 27.3% 34.1% 39.4% 13.0% 28.0% 28.5%
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 76.0% 49.3% 85.2% 72.3% 41.0% 11.1% 23.9% 29.6% 47.2% 35.2% 44.3% 43.8%
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 80.1% 45.4% 82.7% 73.9% 37.1% 7.4% 21.4% 28.2% 54.2% 41.9% 43.6% 49.1%
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 83.3% 53.6% 74.9% 73.1% 38.0% 7.0% 20.5% 26.0% 56.9% 44.2% 53.7% 52.7%
Sarasota-Bradenton-Venice, FL 77.0% 47.5% 87.9% 70.4% 53.5% 13.0% 20.2% 37.6% 42.6% 26.3% 40.2% 37.5%
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre, PA 66.7% 28.4% 83.2% 61.4% 52.9% 1.1% 23.6% 33.7% 40.9% 5.1% 41.6% 33.3%
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 74.5% 39.3% 81.5% 67.2% 40.5% 9.8% 18.0% 30.5% 45.2% 23.9% 41.6% 39.7%
Springfield, MA 81.4% 31.8% 91.6% 75.5% 40.8% 7.5% 26.4% 32.3% 38.8% 22.2% 38.0% 35.1%
Stockton, CA 72.9% 60.6% 89.5% 73.3% 40.1% 1.1% 28.4% 26.5% 42.5% 19.9% 36.9% 33.9%
Syracuse, NY 76.3% 37.4% 77.1% 69.7% 48.4% 13.1% 26.2% 38.4% 30.5% 13.0% 27.8% 27.4%
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 70.8% 43.1% 86.6% 66.4% 48.3% 8.3% 29.4% 35.7% 42.6% 15.4% 37.2% 35.6%
Toledo, OH 75.9% 61.6% 94.4% 76.1% 42.2% 7.4% 31.2% 33.6% 48.8% 16.8% 30.2% 37.6%
Trenton-Ewing, NJ 82.0% 38.8% 84.8% 78.3% 40.6% 0.0% 45.4% 37.7% 59.9% 62.7% 82.9% 66.7%
Tucson, AZ 75.5% 42.5% 85.5% 71.0% 54.0% 6.4% 35.4% 39.9% 39.1% 9.1% 14.1% 26.0%
Tulsa, OK 80.0% 48.2% 80.9% 71.2% 60.5% 4.3% 36.9% 39.6% 36.6% 15.4% 23.8% 26.8%
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 71.6% 33.6% 77.7% 65.2% 53.4% 9.6% 39.2% 40.6% 35.9% 16.4% 36.4% 32.4%
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD 78.5% 33.1% 81.4% 69.2% 42.3% 7.3% 22.5% 29.3% 52.0% 33.0% 34.6% 42.5%
Wichita, KS 75.6% 36.1% 66.3% 60.2% 60.2% 3.4% 31.9% 40.5% 33.8% 7.3% 12.9% 22.4%
Worcester, MA 64.7% 28.7% 89.5% 67.3% 43.8% 5.8% 24.8% 31.7% 35.4% 20.0% 47.6% 36.7%
Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA 75.3% 36.3% 85.4% 71.1% 48.1% 8.5% 29.4% 36.3% 36.1% 7.9% 17.0% 25.9%
Source: Brookings Institution MetroTax model and analysis of 2005 American Community Survey data
*Units "benefit" from an expansion proposal if (A) their EITC credit amount increases; or (B) they become eligible for the EITC under the new parameters
**Tax unit's effective wage equals total annual earnings divided by estimate of total annual hours worked
***Percentage of tax units in households paying more than 50 percent of gross income on housing costs
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